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agents' actions. The first chapter studies a model of currency attacks in which the government can choose a
credible signal about the fundamentals of the economy. Public signals create partial common knowledge that
can lead to multiple equilibria. The optimal policy with commitment is characterized when, if there is
multiplicity, the government only cares about its lowest equilibrium payoff. In this case, the public signal is
informative and leads to a unique equilibrium, which is preferred to a full disclosure policy. Our results
indicate that the government has incentives for being vague in its communication. The highest equilibrium
payoff for the government can be achieved with a two-signal policy. In equilibrium, agents follow the public
signal and take the same action: either there is a coordinated attack, or all speculators refrain from attacking.
The second paper develops a model where short-term reputation concerns guide the public disclosure of
information. There are and high and low states that determine the productivity of investment, and the high
state is more likely if the government is efficient rather than inefficient. Governments know the state and make
public reports with the objective to be perceived as efficient. I find that the inefficient government is never
completely truthful in equilibrium. When the efficient government is truthful, the inefficient government
sends false reports of a high state with positive probability. This creates uncertainty following the report of a
high state: if the true state is high, productivity is underestimated; if the true state is low, productivity is
overestimated.
This bias reduces welfare in the high state, but there is a tradeoff in the low state: marginal entrepreneurs lose
from overestimating productivity; all entrepreneurs gain from a higher aggregate investment. I show that when
the trust in the government's report is low, the inefficient government can improve welfare in the low state by
sending false reports that increase investment. However, as the trust in the false reports rises, the bias in
entrepreneurs' beliefs becomes large and welfare decreases.
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ABSTRACT
POLITICAL ECONOMY OF TRANSPARENCY
Raphael de Albuquerque Galva˜o
Guillermo Ordon˜ez
This dissertation studies public policy in coordination environments, where there is com-
plementarity in the agents’ actions. The first chapter studies a model of currency attacks
in which the government can choose a credible signal about the fundamentals of the econ-
omy. Public signals create partial common knowledge that can lead to multiple equilibria.
The optimal policy with commitment is characterized when, if there is multiplicity, the
government only cares about its lowest equilibrium payoff. In this case, the public signal is
informative and leads to a unique equilibrium, which is preferred to a full disclosure policy.
Our results indicate that the government has incentives for being vague in its communica-
tion. The highest equilibrium payoff for the government can be achieved with a two-signal
policy. In equilibrium, agents follow the public signal and take the same action: either there
is a coordinated attack, or all speculators refrain from attacking. The second paper develops
a model where short-term reputation concerns guide the public disclosure of information.
There are and high and low states that determine the productivity of investment, and the
high state is more likely if the government is efficient rather than inefficient. Governments
know the state and make public reports with the objective to be perceived as efficient. I
find that the inefficient government is never completely truthful in equilibrium. When the
efficient government is truthful, the inefficient government sends false reports of a high state
with positive probability. This creates uncertainty following the report of a high state: if
the true state is high, productivity is underestimated; if the true state is low, productivity
is overestimated. This bias reduces welfare in the high state, but there is a tradeoff in the
low state: marginal entrepreneurs lose from overestimating productivity; all entrepreneurs
gain from a higher aggregate investment. I show that when the trust in the government’s
ii
report is low, the inefficient government can improve welfare in the low state by sending
false reports that increase investment. However, as the trust in the false reports rises, the
bias in entrepreneurs’ beliefs becomes large and welfare decreases.
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CHAPTER 1 : CURRENCY ATTACKS AND GOVERNMENT
COMMUNICATION
with Felipe Shalders
1.1. Introduction
Informed governmental agencies are often criticized for the poor quality of the information
they release. Referring to the early years of Alan Greenspan as head of the Fed, Blinder
and Reis (2005) write:
Soon Greenspan, who is far from plainspoken in any case, became known for
such memorable phrases as ’mumbling with great incoherence’- which he used
(with a hint of humor) to characterize his own version of Fedspeak.
In this paper, we argue that it is optimal for the government to be vague in its communi-
cation. This happens because government’s preferences do not coincide with preferences of
other economic agents. When the government has access to payoff relevant information, it
needs to be vague in order to induce agents to take the government’s most preferred action.
We analyze the environment where a government can release a public signal about the fun-
damentals of the economy. In our model, the government would like to maintain a currency
peg. The peg can be attacked by a continuum of speculators, who wish to profit from a
currency devaluation. Payoffs depend on the state of fundamentals of the economy, the
action taken by speculators, and the government’s choice between defending or abandoning
the peg. If fundamentals are weak (low states), speculators can have large profits from
attacking the currency and the government has to pay a high cost to maintain the peg;
if fundamentals are strong (high states), speculators can have at most small profits from
attacking the currency and the cost of defending the peg is low. The cost of maintain the
peg is increasing in the number of speculators that attack the currency.
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Following Morris and Shin (1998), we assume that speculators receive noisy private signals
about the fundamentals. Thus, if public signals are imprecise, one could expect them to
have small effects on speculators beliefs about the state of fundamentals. This raises the
question: why are vague announcements effective?
When information is dispersed across speculators, an imprecise signal about the fundamen-
tals can have large effects because it changes the beliefs of a speculator about what other
speculators believe. If the government can delegate to an informed and independent agency
(such as the Fed) the mission to send a public signal (such as the FOMC statements) about
the state of fundamentals, this public signal generates partial common knowledge about the
unknown state. Thus, government communication induces coordination among speculators,
even if the public signal has a low precision.
In our model, the government chooses an arbitrary partition of the space of fundamentals.
The public signal reveals in which element of the partition the true fundamentals lie. Only
truthful signals are allowed. Given the common prior and the private and public signals,
speculators use Bayesian updating and then decide whether to attack the currency or not.
In a model where the state of fundamentals is common knowledge, multiple equilibria arise
because of the coordination problem faced by speculators. However, Morris and Shin (1998)
show that the introduction of noisy private signals about the fundamentals leads to a unique
equilibrium, where speculators use cutoff strategies based on their private signals. Our
introduction of public signals breaks the uniqueness result in Morris and Shin (1998).1 To
characterize the optimal disclosure policy we thus assume that, in the case of multiplicity,
the government only cares about the worst equilibrium outcome.2 Under this assumption,
1In a different setting, Angeletos et al. (2006) study a model where policy interventions generate endoge-
nous information, leading to multiple equilibria. We, however, assume that the government can commit
ex-ante to a disclosure policy. If we remove this assumption, our results change significantly. See Section
1.5.
2There are two ways to justify this assumption. First, this selection mechanism maximizes speculators’
payoffs. Second, we take Morris and Shin (1998) as a benchmark to ask whether the government is better
off by sending an informative signal. The optimal signal derived from our equilibrium selection provides a
strictly positive lower bound for the government’s benefits from sending a public signal.
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we show that the optimal disclosure policy is, without loss of generality, a policy with two
signals (a two interval partition). We interpret this result as a deliberate decision from
the government to be vague - indeed, if the government could reveal the exact state of the
economy, it would choose not to do so.
We then move to a characterization of the optimal disclosure policy. Two signals are
sent when the optimal policy is implemented: a low one, corresponding to bad states of
fundamentals (a coordinated attack in this region is always profitable), and a high one, for
the not too bad states (a coordinated attack is not always profitable). We find that the
government ‘’hides” some intermediate states with strong ones in the not too bad region.
Intuitively, this is the optimal signal because, after observing a high signal, speculators
assign a sufficiently high probability to states where it is not profitable to attack, which
allows the government to prevent attacks in intermediate states. In order to do this, the
government commits to acknowledging the really bad states of fundamentals.
We find that the subgame that follows the optimal disclosure policy has a unique equilib-
rium. After observing the low signal, speculators coordinate on attacking and the govern-
ment abandons the currency peg. When a high signal is observed, speculators refrain from
attacking and the peg is maintained. If the government had included too many states in the
not too bad region, this would have lead to an equilibrium with currency attacks after the
high signal, which the government wishes to avoid. In other words, the government wants
to minimize the revelation of bad states by reducing the bad region up to the limit where
not attacking after observing the high signal is still the unique possible action to be taken
in equilibrium.
The final result of this paper is that commitment is essential for the government to benefit
from disclosing information. When the government cannot commit to a disclosure policy,
there exist equilibria in which the government is made worse off by sending a public signal.
Without commitment, the government wishes to fully reveal the good states, which allows
the speculators to coordinate on attacking in bad and intermediate states.
3
Related literature.
This paper is related to the literature on self-fulfilling currency crises when payoffs are
not common knowledge among speculators. The idea that small deviations from common
knowledge can have a large impact on equilibrium outcomes dates back at least to Rubin-
stein’s mail game (Rubinstein (1989)), and has gained great attention since Carlsson and
van Damme (1993) and Morris and Shin (1998).
We build on the model of Morris and Shin (1998) to introduce a public signal that generates
partial common knowledge. In different settings, the interaction between public and private
signals in coordination games has been studied in Morris and Shin (2002),Morris and Shin
(2003), Hellwig (2002).3
In our model, public signals induce coordination among speculators, as in Angeletos et al.
(2006), Angeletos and Pavan (2007, 2009) and Angeletos and Pavan (2013). Breaking the
uniqueness result in Morris and Shin (1998), Angeletos et al. (2006) point out that policy
interventions that convey some information about the fundamentals may lead to multiple
equilibria. We focus on optimal government communication, thus policy in our model is
the revelation of information itself, and, as opposed to the literature, does not change
payoff relevant parameters. The government has incentives to release information about
the fundamentals in order to influence the final outcome of the game. This is true even if,
by restoring partial common knowledge, the game that follows the government’s decision
admits multiple equilibria.
The paper also relates to the literature on coordination motives in information acquisition
(e.g., Hellwig and Veldkamp (2009), Myatt and Wallace (2012)). Hellwig and Veldkamp
(2009) show that, when there are complementarities in the actions, agents “want to know
3In those papers, the public signal cannot generate common knowledge about dominance regions. In
Morris and Shin (1998), this lack of common knowledge is important for equilibrium uniqueness. In our
model, we allow for the public signal to make such revelations.
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what others know”. In line with their findings, our equilibrium displays speculators that
coordinate on the public signal and take the same action regardless of their private infor-
mation.
Finally, the paper relates to the literature on Bayesian persuasion (e.g., Kamenica and
Gentzkow (2011)), which studies the optimal signal structure from the perspective of a
sender who wants to influence a rational Bayesian receiver to take the sender’s preferred
action. This is done by affecting the receiver’s beliefs. In addition to this effect, our model
also takes into account the interaction of speculators who have private information, where
a public signal can play an important role on coordination. The optimal policy is designed
to maximize the probability that speculators coordinate on not attacking the currency peg.
Structure of the paper. The remainder of this paper is divided as follows. In Section
1.2, a motivating example is presented. Section 1.3 presents the model and some of its
equilibrium properties. The main results are described in Section 1.4. Section 1.5 analyzes
the model without the commitment assumption and Section 1.6 concludes the paper. A
numerical example is provided in Appendix A.1, and the proofs that are omitted in the
main text are presented in Appendix A.2.
1.2. A simple example
Before the full model is introduced, we present an example that that conveys the main
ideas in this paper. It illustrates the effects of adding a public signal to a model of currency
attacks in which speculators observe a private signal about the fundamentals.
Consider an economy where the state of the fundamentals is given by θ ∈ Θ = {0, 0.5, 1},
and the common prior assigns the same probability for each state. There is a continuum of
speculators with unit mass. The government initially pegs the exchange rate at 1, and the
equilibrium rate without intervention is θ. Speculators decide simultaneously whether to
attack the currency peg or not. Given θ and the size of the attack, the government decides
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whether to abandon the peg or defend the currency.
Each speculator pays a cost of t = 0.4 to attack the currency peg, and the gross payoff
is 1 − θ if the peg is abandoned (a successful attack). The speculator’s net payoff from a
successful attack is thus given by
u(θ) =

0.6, if θ = 0,
0.1, if θ = 0.5,
−0.4, if θ = 1,
and the payoff from an unsuccessful attack is −0.4. If the speculator refrains from attacking,
his payoff is 0.
The government derives a value v = 1 from the currency peg, and the cost of defending it
is given by c(θ, α) = 1.3− θ+ α, where α is the mass of speculators who attack the peg. If
the government abandons the peg, its payoff is 0. The critical mass of attackers necessary
for the government to abandon the peg is given by
a(θ) =

0, if θ = 0,
0.2, if θ = 0.5,
0.7, if θ = 1,
that is, if θ is the state and α is the fraction of speculators who attack the currency, then
the government abandons the peg if α > a(θ), and defends the peg if α < a(θ).
1.2.1. Common knowledge
If the state of the fundamentals is common knowledge, the game admits two equilibria.
In one equilibrium there is a coordinated attack on the currency peg after θ = 0.5 is
observed, which forces the government to abandon the peg. The other equilibrium features
no attack after θ = 0.5 is observed, and the government chooses to maintain the peg. In
both equilibria there is no attack when θ = 1, since the speculators know that it is not
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profitable to attack; and every speculator attacks the currency when θ = 0, since they know
that the the government will abandon the peg regardless of the size of the attack.
1.2.2. Private signal
Suppose that the true state is unknown, but the speculators observe a private signal x ∈
{0, 0.5, 1}, with conditional probability P(x|θ) as follows:
x = 0 x = 0.5 x = 1
P(x|θ = 0) .50 .25 .25
P(x|θ = .5) .25 .50 .25
P(x|θ = 1) .25 .25 .50
As in Morris and Shin (1998), this game admits a unique equilibrium. In equilibrium,
speculators attack the currency if the private signal is x ≤ 0.5, and the government abandons
the peg if θ ≤ 0.5.4
1.2.3. Private and public signals
Now suppose that the government can commit to a disclosure policy as follows. First, the
government partitions the state space Θ, and then it sends a public signal y that reveals
in which element of the partition the true fundamentals lie. The introduction of a public
4The proof of is constructed in 6 steps:
1. If θ = 0, the government abandons the peg in equilibrium regardless of the size of the attack.
2. If x = 0, since the peg is abandoned when θ = 0, the equilibrium payoff from attacking is at least
P(θ = 0|x = 0)− 0.4 = 0.1; thus, speculators attack when x = 0.
3. If θ = 0.5, since speculators attack when x = 0, the size of the attack is at least P(x = 0|θ = 0.5) =
0.25 > a(0.5) = 0.2: thus, the government abandons the peg when θ = 0.5.
4. If x = 0.5, since the peg is abandoned when θ ≤ 0.5, the equilibrium payoff from attacking is at least
P(θ = 0|x = 0.5) + 0.5P(θ = 0.5|x = 0.5)− 0.4 = 0.25 + 0.52 − 0.4 = 0.1: speculators attack.
5. If x = 1, since the payoff from attacking when θ = 1 is -0.4 (whether it is successful or not), the
equilibrium payoff from attacking is P(θ = 0|x = 1) + 0.5P(θ = 0.5|x = 1) − 0.4 = −0.025; thus,
speculators refrain from attacking when x = 1.
6. Finally, if θ = 1, the size of the attack is P(x < 1|θ = 1) = 0.5 < 0.7 = a(1),and the government
defends the peg.
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signal can lead to multiple equilibria. For example, if the government chooses to fully
disclose the fundamentals by choosing the partition {{0}, {0.5}, {1}}, we are back to the
common knowledge case and there are two equilibria.
Suppose that, in case of multiplicity, the government only cares about the worst equilib-
rium outcome. We claim that, in this case, the optimal partition is {{0}, {0.5, 1}}. The
government thus sends two signals:
y =
 yl , if θ = 0,yh , if θ ∈ {0.5, 1}.
If the public signal is y = yl, it becomes common knowledge that the true state is θ =
0, which means that the currency peg will be abandoned and it is profitable to attack,
regardless of the other speculators’ behavior and the private signal. Hence, every speculator
must attack in equilibrium after observing y = yl. If y = yh, it becomes common knowledge
that it is never profitable to attack the currency peg when no one else attacks. This leads
to an equilibrium in which speculators coordinate on not attacking if y = yh.
It turns out the equilibrium is unique. Speculators follow the public signal and attack if and
only if y = yl, and the government abandons the peg if only if θ = 0. The government is
strictly better off by sending a public signal, since it eliminates attacks when θ = 1. Without
a public signal, when θ = 1 half the speculators observe a private signal x ≤ 0.5 and attack
the peg, so the government has to pay a cost to defend the currency. Furthermore, in
the worst equilibrium with full disclosure, the peg is abandoned if θ ∈ {0, 0.5}. Thus,
the optimal policy strictly dominates full disclosure (common knowledge) or no disclosure
(uninformative public signal) for the government.
The remainder of paper shows that the results in this section still hold in a more general
framework. In the full model, when the government only cares about the worst equilibrium
outcome, it is without loss of generality to consider only two-signal structures. Public
policy thus divides the fundamentals into two intervals: a lower interval, where the peg is
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abandoned and speculators coordinate on attacking; an upper interval, where the peg is
maintained and no speculator attacks. The optimal policy involves maximizing the size of
the upper interval, while keeping the equilibrium unique.
1.3. Model
1.3.1. Actions and payoffs
The model is similar to the one in Morris and Shin (1998), with the addition of a public
signal. There is a currency peg in the economy and speculators have to decide whether to
attack it or not. There is a continuum of speculators of measure one, who are indexed by i
and uniformly distributed on [0, 1]. The state of fundamentals in the economy is given by
θ, which is uniformly distributed on Θ = [0, 1]. In the absence of government intervention,
the exchange rate is a function f(·) of the state θ, where f(·) is continuous and strictly
increasing. The exchange rate is initially pegged by the government at e∗, with e∗ ≥ f(θ)
for all θ.
A speculator attacks the currency by selling short one unit of currency at a cost t > 0. If
the speculator attacks and the peg is abandoned, his payoff is e∗ − f(θ) − t, whereas the
payoff from attacking when the currency is defended is −t. If the speculator does not attack
the currency, his payoff is zero.
The government derives a value v > 0 from maintaining the currency peg. There is a cost
c(α, θ) to defend the peg, where α is a mass of speculators who attack the currency. The
cost c is continuous, strictly increasing in α and strictly decreasing in θ. Hence, the payoff
from defending the peg is v − c(α, θ), and the payoff from abandoning the peg is zero. The
following assumptions are made:
• c(0, 0) > v: the government abandons the peg if fundamentals are sufficiently weak,
even if no one attacks;
• c(1, 1) > v: the government abandons the peg if everyone attacks, even if fundamentals
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are good;
• e∗ − f(1)− t < 0: it is not profitable for speculators to attack the currency if funda-
mentals are good enough.
Denote by θ the value of θ that solves v = c(0, θ). If θ ≤ θ, the government finds it optimal
to abandon the peg regardless of the size of the attack. Denote by θ¯ the value of θ such
that e∗ − f(θ)− t = 0. If θ > θ¯, attacking is not profitable even if the peg is abandoned.
We assume that θ < θ¯.5 When the state is common knowledge, we can divide Θ in three
intervals, as it has been pointed out in the literature.6 Following the terminology in Morris
and Shin (1998):
• if θ ∈ [0, θ], the currency is unstable: the government always abandons the peg;
• if θ ∈ (θ, θ¯), the currency is ripe for attack : a coordinated attack is profitable and, if
there is coordination on not attacking, attacking is not profitable;
• if θ ∈ [θ¯, 1], the currency is stable: it is never profitable to attack the peg.
1.3.2. Timing and information
The game has three stages. In the first stage, before observing θ, the government commits
to a disclosure policy, which is announced to the speculators. In the second stage, once
θ is realized, a public signal y is sent according to the disclosure policy.7 Speculators do
not observe θ, just the public signal y and a private signal x. Given x and y, speculators
simultaneously decide whether to attack the currency or not. In the last stage, the govern-
ment observes θ and the size of the attack, and decides whether to defend the currency or
5This condition holds for a large v and a small t.
6See, for example, Obstfeld (1996) and Morris and Shin (1998).
7There are two interpretations for the disclosure policy. One is that the government commits to a
disclosure rule, observes θ, and then sends the prescribed signal y(θ). Another interpretation is that the
government commits to an information acquisition procedure and, if the state is θ, the government observes
y(θ) and announces it. The latter is in line with the Bayesian persuasion literature (see, for example,
Kamenica and Gentzkow (2011)). In this case, the government is not more informed than the speculators
when the public signal is sent.
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abandon the peg. The structure of the game is assumed to be common knowledge.
We denote a partition of the interval [0, 1] by P = {mn}Nn=0, where 0 = m0 < m1 < ... <
mN = 1, and N ∈ N.8 The n-th interval of the partition P is denoted by yn, with
y1 = [0,m1], y2 = (m1,m2], ..., yn = (mn−1,mn], ..., yN = (mN−1, 1].
When the public signal y = yn is sent, it becomes common knowledge that θ ∈ yn. When
N = 1, the public signal is uninformative.
It is important to stress that, since the government commits to a choice of P before learning
the true state θ, there is no strategic learning, i.e., the choice of P does not change the
speculators’ beliefs about what the government knows.9 In Section 1.5, we show that
commitment is essential for our results.
In addition to the public signal, speculator i observes a private signal xi, where
xi = θ + σεi,
with σ > 0. The idiosyncratic noise εi is drawn from a distribution with probability
density function (pdf) g(·), and cumulative distribution function (cdf) G(·). Each εi is
independently and identically distributed across agents and independent of θ. We assume
that supp(g) = [−ε¯, ε¯], ε¯ > 0, and that g(·) is differentiable on (−ε¯, ε¯). Define ε = σε¯, and
let 2ε < min{θ, 1− θ¯}.
The derivative of g(·), g′(·), is assumed to be bounded and such that
if g′(ε˜) < 0, then g′(εˆ) ≤ 0 ∀εˆ ∈ (ε˜, ε¯). (1.1)
8In this presentation, we restrict the analysis to partitions with a finite number of intervals. The results
still hold if the partitions can have a countable number of intervals.
9This is in contrast to Angeletos et al. (2006).
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Since the common prior on θ is uniform on [0, 1], the posterior distribution of θ given private
signal x and public signal y has probability density function φy(θ|x), where
φyn(θ|x) =

1
σ
g(x−θ
σ
)
G
(
x−mn−1
σ
)
−G(x−mnσ )
, if θ ∈ yn
0, otherwise
. (1.2)
The derivation of φyn(θ|x) is presented in Appendix A.2.1.10
1.3.3. Equilibrium
We solve this game by backward induction. In the last stage, given an attack of size α and
a state θ, the government optimally chooses to abandon the peg if and only if c(α, θ) ≥ v.
In the second stage, given a partition P , speculators observe the public signal and their own
private signal. Anticipating the government’s decision in the next stage, they simultaneously
decide whether to attack the currency or not. In the first stage, the government chooses
a partition P . The multiplicity in the second stage of the game poses a selection problem
that we solve by assuming that the government only cares about the worst equilibrium
outcome. Alternatively, we could assume that speculators play the equilibrium strategy
that maximizes their own payoff (or, equivalently, the one that minimizes the government’s
payoff).
More formally, suppose the government chooses a partition P = {mn}Nn=0. Let pn = P(θ ∈
yn) be the probability that θ lies in the interval yn of the partition.
11 In addition, consider
the subgame that follows the disclosure of y = yn. Denote Vn the infimum of all government’s
equilibrium payoffs when y = yn.
12 We let V (P ) =
∑N
n=1 pnVn. The government’s problem
is to choose P to maximize V (P ).
10There is a finite number of pairs (x, y) that fully reveal θ: when y = yn and x = mn + ε, we have
P(θ = mn|y = yn, x = mn + ε) = 1; likewise, when y = y1 and x = −ε, then P(θ = 0|y = y1, x = −ε) = 1.
For all other pairs (x, y), the conditional density of θ is given by (1.2).
11Since we assume that θ is uniformly distributed on [0, 1], we have pn = mn −mn−1.
12Such infimum always exists as the government always has the option to abandon the peg, so the equi-
librium payoff is bounded below by 0.
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The problem of the government in the last stage is simple. For each θ, let a(θ) be the
solution to v = c(a, θ). This function represents the critical mass of speculators that have
to attack the currency in order to induce the government to abandon the peg. Note that,
given our assumptions on c(·, ·), we have that a(·) is continuous, a(θ) = 0 for θ ≤ θ, and
a(·) is strictly increasing for θ > θ.
For a given profile of strategies for the speculators, the measure of speculators who attack
the currency given a pair of signals (x, y) is denoted by pi(x, y). If the state is θ, the
proportion of speculators who attack the currency is given by
s(θ, pi) =
∫ θ+ε
θ−ε
pi(x, yn(θ))
1
σ
g
(
x− θ
σ
)
dx. (1.3)
where yn(θ) is the public signal sent according to P when the state is θ. The government
maintains the peg when
s(θ, pi) < a(θ). (1.4)
Thus, the event where there is a regime change is given by
A(pi) = {θ : s(θ, pi) ≥ a(θ)}. (1.5)
The payoff to a speculator from attacking the currency at state θ, when the aggregate
strategy is pi, is given by
h(θ, pi) =
 e
∗ − f(θ)− t, if θ ∈ A(pi)
−t, if θ /∈ A(pi)
. (1.6)
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The expected payoff from attacking the currency given a pair of signals (x, yn) is given by
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uyn(x, pi) =
∫
[x−ε,x+ε]∩yn
h(θ, pi)φyn(θ|x)dθ (1.8)
=
∫
[x−ε,x+ε]∩yn∩A(pi)
[e∗ − f(θ)]φyn(θ|x)dθ − t.
In equilibrium, pi(x, y) = 1 if uy(x, pi) > 0, and pi(x, y) = 0 if uy(x, pi) < 0.
1.3.4. Equilibrium properties
We now present some auxiliary results, which are similar to the ones in Morris and Shin
(1998). The first result shows that, if other speculators are more likely to attack the currency
peg for every private signal x, then the expected payoff from attacking increases.
Lemma 1 For a given public signal y, if pi(x, y) ≥ pi′(x, y) for all x, then uy(x, pi) ≥
uy(x, pi
′) for all x.
Proof: See Appendix A.2.2. 
For k ∈ [−ε, 1 + ε], let the indicator function Ik be defined as
Ik(x) =
 1, if x < k0, if x ≥ k . (1.9)
When aggregate short sales are given by Ik (in particular, short sales will not depend on the
public signal y), the proportion of speculators who attack the currency at state θ is given
13 Equation (1.7) holds for all but a finite number of pairs (x, y), as described in footnote 10. If y = yn
and x = mn + ε,
uyn(mn + ε, pi) = [e
∗ − f(mn)]I(mn)− t, (1.7)
where I(θ) is an indicator function that equals 1 if the peg is abandoned at state θ. Similarly,
uy1(−ε, pi) = e∗ − f(0)− t,
since the peg is always abandoned when θ = 0.
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by
s(θ, Ik) = G
(
k − θ
σ
)
. (1.10)
Note that s(θ, Ik) is strictly decreasing in θ for θ ∈ (k − ε, k + ε), and constant otherwise.
We denote by θk the largest value of θ at which the government finds it optimal to abandon
the currency peg when the speculators’ aggregate short sales are given by Ik. As in Morris
and Shin (1998), let ψ(k) = min{θk−k, ε}. Appendix A.2.3 provides a derivation of θk and
ψ. The threshold θk is increasing in k, and the government finds it optimal to abandon the
peg for all θ ≤ θk. The function ψ(·) is continuous, ψ(k) = ε for k ≤ θ − ε, ψ(1 + ε) = −ε,
and ψ(·) is strictly decreasing for k ∈ (θ − ε, 1 + ε].
Let Xy denote the set of private signals that can be received by the speculators when the
public signal is y. Then Xy1 = [−ε,m1 + ε] and, for n > 1, Xyn = (mn−1 − ε,mn + ε].
Since the currency peg is abandoned if and only if θ ∈ [0, k + ψ(k)], the payoff function
uyn(k, Ik) is given by
uyn(k, Ik) =
∫
[k−ε,k+ψ(k)]∩yn
[e∗ − f(θ)]φyn(θ|k)dθ − t, (1.11)
for all k ∈ Xyn .14
Lemma 2 For a given public signal y, uy(k, Ik) is continuous in k, for all possible private
signals k ∈ Xy.
14As in footnote 13, equation (1.11) holds for all but a finite number of (x, y) that fully reveal θ. The
reader can check that
limk→mn+εuyn(k, Ik) = uyn(mn + ε, Imn+ε), ∀n,
limk→−εuy1(k, Ik) = uy1(−ε, I−ε),
and that for a fixed k,
limx→mn+εuyn(x, Ik) = uyn(mn + ε, Ik), ∀n,
limx→−εuy1(x, Ik) = uy1(−ε, Ik).
For the sake of brevity, in the remainder of the paper we omit these finite number of cases. The limits above
guarantee that our results still hold.
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Proof: See Appendix A.2.4. 
Let u(k, Ik) be the payoff function when there is no public signal. Then
u(k, Ik) =
∫ b
a
[e∗ − f(θ)]
1
σg
(
x−θ
σ
)
G
(
x
σ
)−G (x−1σ )dθ − t, (1.12)
where a = max{k − ε, 0}, and b = k + ψ(k). Note that the payoff function is continuous in
k. The following lemma shows that it is also strictly decreasing in k.
Lemma 3 For k ∈ (ε, 1− ε), the payoff function u(k, Ik) is strictly decreasing in k.
Proof: See Appendix A.2.5. 
1.4. Optimal signal structure
This section presents the results of the model with commitment when, in case of multiplicity
after a partition choice, the government only cares about the worst equilibrium outcome.15
First, we show that there is no loss of generality in considering partitions with at most two
intervals. Then, we prove that it is not optimal for the government to chose a one-interval
partition and send the uninformative signal. Finally, the optimal partition is characterized.
1.4.1. No loss of generality in two-interval partitions
Let Φy(θ|x) denote the cumulative distribution function of θ conditional on private signal
x and public signal y. To find the optimal partition, the following assumption is made.
Assumption 1 Let the public signal be y. For any pair of private signals x1 and x2, with
x1 < x2, Φy(θ|x2) ≤ Φy(θ|x1) for all θ.
This assumption means that the distribution of θ conditional on y and x2 first-order stochas-
tically dominates the distribution of θ conditional on y and x1. In Appendix A.2.6, it is
shown that Assumption 1 is satisfied, for example, if the idiosyncratic noise on [−ε¯, ε¯] fol-
15When there is no ambiguity, we say equilibrium when we mean the equilibrium of the subgame that
follows the choice of P .
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lows a concave or a truncated normal distribution. Assumption 1 leads to the following
lemma.
Lemma 4 Suppose that Assumption 1 is satisfied. When the aggregate strategy is given by
Ik, the payoff from attacking the currency, uy(x, Ik), is decreasing in the private signal x.
Proof: Suppose that the aggregate strategy is given by Ik. Let I(θ) be an indicator function
that equals 1 if the currency peg is abandoned when the state is θ. Since, by assumption,
speculators follow a cutoff rule, I(θ) is weakly decreasing in θ.16 Define
U(θ) = [f(θ)− e∗]I(θ),
which is negative and increasing. Consider a public signal y and a pair of private signals x1
and x2, with x1 < x2. Then
∫ 1
0
U(θ)dΦy(θ|x2) ≥
∫ 1
0
U(θ)dΦy(θ|x1),
where the inequality comes from Assumption 1 and the fact that U is increasing. Hence
uy(x1, Ik) = −
∫ 1
0
U(θ)dΦy(θ|x1)− t
≥ −
∫ 1
0
U(θ)dΦy(θ|x2)− t
= uy(x2, Ik),
which completes the proof. 
The following two lemmas are needed for the main results. The first one shows a sufficient
condition for a cutoff strategy for the speculators to exist in equilibrium, while the second
lemma characterizes the speculators’ equilibrium strategy that minimizes the government’s
payoff for a given public signal y.
16I(θ) = 1, if θ ≤ θk; and I(θ) = 0, if θ > θk.
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Lemma 5 Let the public signal be y, and suppose that Assumption 1 is satisfied. If k solves
uy(k, Ik) = 0, then there is an equilibrium where the aggregate short sales after y is observed
are given by Ik.
Proof: Fix y. Suppose that k solves uy(k, Ik) = 0, and that the aggregate short sales are
given by Ik. If a speculator receives a signal x < k, his payoff from attacking the currency
is given by
uy(x, Ik) ≥ uy(k, Ik) = 0,
where the inequality comes from Lemma 4. Hence the payoff from attacking is (weakly)
larger than the payoff from not attacking. Similarly, if x ≥ k, the payoff from attacking the
currency is
uy(x, Ik) ≤ uy(k, Ik) = 0,
therefore not attacking yields a (weakly) larger payoff than attacking. Both statements
imply that following a cutoff rule Ik is optimal for the speculator, given that all other
speculators are using the same rule. This means that there exists an equilibrium in which
Ik is the aggregate selling strategy. 
Lemma 6 Suppose that Assumption 1 is satisfied. For a given public signal y,
i. if uy(k, Ik) < 0 for all k ∈ Xy, then, in any equilibrium, pi(x, y) = 0 for all x ∈ Xy.
ii. if uy(k
′, Ik′) ≥ 0 for some k′ ∈ Xy, then, in the worst equilibrium for the govern-
ment, speculators use the cutoff rule Ik after observing y, where k = sup{k′ ∈ Xyn :
uyn(k
′, Ik′) ≥ 0}.
Proof:
i. Suppose that uy(k, Ik) < 0 for all k ∈ Xy. Let pi be any equilibrium strategy, and
suppose by way of contradiction that there is x′ ∈ Xy such that pi(x′, y) > 0. If this is
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true, then the set {x ∈ Xy : pi(x, y) > 0} is non-empty and we can define x¯y as
x¯y = sup{x ∈ Xy : pi(x, y) > 0}.
Note that x¯y ∈ Xy because Xy is right-closed. Also note that, if pi is an equilibrium
strategy, then for any x˜ ∈ {x ∈ Xy : pi(x, y) > 0}, it has to be true that uy(x˜, pi) ≥ 0.
By the continuity of uy in the private signal, uy(x¯y, pi) ≥ 0. From Lemma 1,
uy(x¯y, Ix¯y) ≥ uy(x¯y, pi) ≥ 0
Thus, uy(x¯y, Ix¯y) ≥ 0, which contradicts the assumption that uy(k, Ik) < 0 for all
k ∈ Xy.
ii. If u(k, Ik) > 0, by continuity (Lemma 2), it has to be true that k is the right bound
of the interval Xy and, by the decreasing property of uy in x (Lemma 4), Ik is an
equilibrium strategy. If u(k, Ik) = 0, then we know that Ik is an equilibrium strategy
(Lemma 5). Using the same arguments from part i., assume by way of contradiction
that there is an equilibrium with pi(x′, y) > 0 for some x′ > k. Let x¯y = sup{x ∈ Xy :
pi(x, y) > 0} ∈ Xy. By Lemma 1, uy(x¯y, Ix¯y) ≥ uy(x¯y, pi) ≥ 0, which contradicts the
assumption that k is the supremum of the set {k′ ∈ Xy : uy(k′, Ik′) ≥ 0}.

Recall that θ¯ defines the threshold θ at which investors’ payoff from a successful attack is
0. The following lemma characterizes the worst equilibrium outcome for the government
given a choice of P .
Lemma 7 Suppose that Assumption 1 is satisfied and consider an arbitrary partition P =
{mn}Nn=0. Given P , the equilibrium that minimizes the government’s payoff involves the
following:
i. for all n such that mn ≤ θ¯, speculators always attack the currency if y = yn;
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ii. for all n such that mn−1 ≥ θ¯, speculators never attack the currency if y = yn;
iii. for all n such that mn−1 < θ¯ and mn > θ¯,17 speculators never attack if uyn(k, Ik) < 0
for all k ∈ Xyn. Otherwise, speculators follow Ikn after observing yn, where kn =
sup{k ∈ Xyn : uyn(k, Ik) ≥ 0}.
Proof: i. Let n be such that mn ≤ θ¯. If speculators always attack the currency after observ-
ing yn, then the government abandons the peg (because c(1, 1) > v) and the speculators
have a positive payoff (by the definition of θ¯). Hence always attacking after observing yn is
an equilibrium strategy for the speculators, and no other strategy can yield a lower payoff
for the government when θ ∈ yn.
ii. Let n be such that mn−1 ≥ θ¯. If a speculator attacks after observing yn, his expected
payoff is strictly negative. Hence there is no equilibrium where speculators attack when
θ ∈ yn.
iii. Follows immediately from Lemma 6. 
Lemma 7 provides the intuition as to why there is no loss of generality in considering only
two-interval partitions. If there are several n such that mn ≤ θ¯, then the government could
group all these yn. Likewise, if there are several n such that mn−1 ≥ θ¯, the government can
group these yn. This rules out any partition P with four or more intervals.
Now consider a partition P with three intervals, that is, P = {0,m1,m2, 1}, where m1 <
θ¯ < m2. If the government maintains the peg for all θ ∈ (m1,m2], then the government
could have chosen the partition P ′ = {0,m1, 1}. If the government abandons the peg for
all θ ∈ (m1,m2], then the government could have chosen the partition P ′ = {0,m2, 1}. If
the government abandons the peg for some but not all θ ∈ (m1,m2], then, by Lemma 7,
speculators use a cutoff rule when y = (m1,m2]. This cutoff strategy generates a threshold
θ′ ∈ y2, such that the government abandons the peg if θ ∈ (m1, θ′] and maintains the peg
17There is at most one such n.
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if θ ∈ (θ′,m2]. But if this is the case, then the government could have chosen the partition
P ′ = {0, θ′, 1}. We use Lemma 15 (in the appendix A.2.7) to formalize this result, which is
presented in Theorem 1.
Theorem 1 Suppose that Assumption 1 is satisfied. Then, for any partition P = {mn}Nn=0
with N > 2, there exists P ′ = {m′n}N
′
n=0 with N
′ = 2, such that V (P ′) ≥ V (P ).
Proof: Given Lemma 7, the only non trivial result left to show is that, for any P =
{0,m1,m2, 1}, with m1 < θ¯ < m2, there is a P ′ = {0,m′, 1} such that V (P ′) ≥ V (P ).
• Case 1: the government maintains the peg for all θ in y2. Consider the alternative
partition P ′ = {0,m1, 1}. The government cannot be worse off if θ ≤ m1.
We know from Lemma 7 that u(m1,m2](k, Ik) < 0 for any k ∈ X(m1,m2]. Since m2 > θ¯,
we also know that u(m2,1](k, Ik) < 0 for any k ∈ X(m2,1]. From Lemma 15,
u(m1,1](k, Ik) ≤ u(m1,m2](k, Ik) < 0, for any k ∈ (m1 − ε,m2 + ε],
and
u(m1,1](k, Ik) = u(m2,1](k, Ik) < 0, for any k ∈ (m2 + ε, 1 + ε].
The inequalities imply that u(m1,1](k, Ik) < 0 for k ∈ X(m1,1]. From Lemma 6, no one
attacks if θ > m1. Thus, V (P
′) ≥ V (P ).
• Case 2: the government abandons the peg for all θ in y2. Consider the partition P ′ =
{0,m2, 1}. The government is not worse off if θ ≤ m2. If θ > m2, speculators observe
the public signal (m2, 1], and since m2 > θ¯, no one attacks. Thus, V (P
′) ≥ V (P ).
• Case 3: the government abandons the peg at some but not all θ in y2. From Lemma
6, speculators use a cutoff rule Ik2 .
From Lemma 7, speculators follow a cutoff rule Ik2 after observing y2, where k2 =
sup{k ∈ Xy2 : uy2(k, Ik) = 0}. Given the speculators’ strategy, there exists θk2 ∈
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(m1,m2] such that the peg is abandoned if and only if θ ≤ θk2 . From Lemma 15,
increasing m1 would never increase the cutoff k, and it would never increase the
threshold θk.
This implies that, with the partition P˜ ′ = {0, θk2 ,m2, 1}, no one attacks if θ ∈
(θk2 ,m2]. From Case 2, when the partition is P
′ = {0, θk2 , 1}, there is no attack
if θ ∈ (θk2 ,m2]. By changing the partition from P to P ′, the government no longer
has to pay a cost to defend the currency on (θk2 , θk2 + ε), therefore V (P
′) > V (P ).

For the remainder of the paper, we denote the two element partition P = {0,m, 1} by Pm.
1.4.2. No disclosure is not optimal
This subsection shows that it is not optimal for the government to send the uninformative
public signal, i.e., to set N = 1. The result is obtained by proving that there exist partition
choices with N = 2 that strictly dominate the uninformative partition with N = 1. When
N = 2, the government’s problem is equivalent to a choice of m ∈ [0, 1] such that speculators
will learn whether θ ≤ m or θ > m. Given the choice of m, they observe the public signal
y ∈ {yl, yh}, drawn as follows:18
y =
 yl, if θ ∈ [0,m]yh, if θ ∈ (m, 1] . (1.13)
In the model without a public signal, which has the same outcome as the case m = 1, it
is known from Morris and Shin (1998) that the equilibrium is unique. In that equilibrium,
speculators follow a cutoff rule and attack the currency if and only if their private sigal is
below x∗, where x∗ solves u(x∗, Ix∗) = 0. The currency peg is thus abandoned if and only
18To distinguish the case where the government is restricted to N ≤ 2 from the general case, we change
the notation: we use m instead of m1; yl and yh instead of y1 and y2.
22
if θ ≤ θ∗, where θ∗ makes the government indifferent between defending the peg or not.19
The next lemma shows that, for any choice of m < 1, there is always an equilibrium where
government and speculators coordinate on the public signal for at least one realization of y.
Lemma 8 Consider the subgame that follows the choice of m < 1 by the government. If
m ≤ θ¯, there exists an equilibrium where the government abandons the peg when θ ∈ [0,m],
and the speculators attack the currency after observing y = yl. If m ≥ θ, there exists
an equilibrium where the government defends the peg if θ ∈ (m, 1], and there is no attack
following the signal yh.
Proof: Let m ≤ θ¯ and suppose that all speculators attack the currency after observing
y = yl. Given the speculators’ aggregate strategy, the government abandons the currency
peg if θ ∈ [0,m], and it is indeed optimal for each speculator to attack if y = yl. Now let
m ≥ θ and suppose that no speculator attacks the currency after observing y = yh. Given
the speculators’ strategy, the government defends the peg if θ ∈ (m, 1], and therefore it is
indeed optimal for each speculator not to attack if y = yh. 
For any choice of m ∈ [θ, θ¯], there exist an equilibrium where speculators follow the public
signal: they coordinate on attacking if y = yl, and they refrain from attacking if y = yh.
In this equilibrium, the currency peg is abandoned if θ ≤ m. This result is presented in
Corollary 1 below.
Corollary 1 For all m ∈ [θ, θ¯], there exists an equilibrium where the currency peg is aban-
doned if and only if θ ∈ [0,m], and speculators attack the currency if and only if θ ∈ [0,m].
The following theorem compares the equilibrium outcomes for a given choice of m with the
unique equilibrium outcome in the absence of a public signal.
Theorem 2 Fix m. If m = θ∗, there is a unique equilibrium, in which speculators follow
the public signal. If m 6= θ∗, the equilibrium may not be unique. There are bounds x∗ ≥ x∗
19That is, θ∗ solves s(θ, Ix∗) = a(θ).
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and x¯∗ ≤ x∗ such that, in any equilibrium, pi(x, yl) ≥ Ix∗(x) and pi(x, yh) ≤ Ix¯∗(x) for all
x. The equilibria are as follows:
i. if m < θ∗: speculators always attack the currency and the peg is abandoned if y = yl;
moreover, if m ∈ (x∗ − ε, θ∗), then x¯∗ < x∗;
ii. if m > θ∗: the currency is not attacked and the peg is defended if y = yh; moreover,
if m ∈ (θ∗, x∗ + ε), then x∗ > x∗.
Proof: See Appendix A.2.8. 
Part i. of Theorem 2 states that, when the government chooses m < θ∗ and the public
signal is y = yh, the set of private signals that induce attack is contained in the set of
private signals that would induce attack in the absence of a public signal. Thus, for any
θ ∈ yh, the size of the attack does not increase. Moreover, if Assumption 1 holds, we use
Lemma 7 to conclude that, in the worst equilibrium for the government, the cutoff used
when y = yh is below the cutoff when there is no public signal. Conversely, part ii. and
Assumption 1 imply that, when m > θ∗, speculators will use a higher cutoff when y = yl.
This can be seen in Figure 1, which is constructed from the numerical example in Appendix
A.
If the government chooses m = θ∗, the equilibrium is unique and the currency peg is
abandoned if and only if θ ≤ θ∗, as in the equilibrium of the game without a public signal.
However, no speculator attacks the currency when θ > θ∗, whereas without the public
signal some speculators would still attack the currency for some θ > θ∗, increasing the cost
of maintaining the peg. Thus, the government is strictly better off by the introduction of
the public signal. Note that the speculators are also strictly better off now that all of them
attack when the currency peg is abandoned, and no one attacks when peg is maintained.
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Table 1 summarizes the results in Theorem 2.20
Probability of Devaluation Equilibrium payoff
m ≤ x∗ − ε weakly lower weakly higher
x∗ − ε < m ≤ θ∗ strictly lower strictly higher
θ∗ < m < x∗ + ε strictly higher effect is ambiguous
m ≥ x∗ + ε weakly higher weakly lower
Table 1: Given m, the second column compares the equilibrium probability of currency devalua-
tion with the case without a public signal. The last column compares the government’s possible
equilibrium payoffs with the unique equilibrium payoff in the game without a public signal.
Note that any choice m > θ∗ is strictly dominated by m = θ∗. Compared to the unique
equilibrium with m = θ∗, any equilibrium with m > θ∗ features a strictly higher probability
of devaluation and, for all θ, there is a weakly larger mass of speculators attacking the
currency. This leads to the following corollary.
Corollary 2 The choice of any m > θ∗ is strictly dominated by m = θ∗.
Corollary 2 implies that the choice of m = 1 is strictly dominated by choosing N = 2 and
m = θ∗. Thus sending an uninformative public signal is not optimal for the government.
1.4.3. Characterization of the optimal signal structure
We are now ready to find the optimal partition for the government. Define M as
M = {m : there is no attack in any equilibrium after yh}.
Note that M 6= ∅ because θ∗ ∈M . Define m as
m = inf M.
Figure 2 from Appendix A gives the intuition about how the optimal partition should be.
Any choice of m > θ∗ is strictly dominated by m = θ∗, which leads to a unique equilibrium,
20If m > θ∗, the currency is not attacked when y = yh. For m close enough to θ∗, the government’s payoff
can be higher with the public signal if the increase in the probability of devaluation when y = yl is offset by
a lower cost of defending the currency when y = yh.
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with no attacks when θ ∈ (m, 1]. Starting from m = θ∗, as m decreases, the government is
strictly better off as long as the equilibrium is still unique. Decreasing m will increase the
range of fundamentals that lead to no currency attacks. However, there is a discontinuity
in the government’s payoff at m. Decreasing m even further to the region where it leads to
multiple equilibria makes the government strictly worse off. Thus, the government wants
decrease m up to the limit where the equilibrium is still unique, m. This result is formalized
in the following theorem.
Theorem 3 Suppose that Assumption 1 is satisfied. For every partition P , V (P ) ≤ V ,
where
V = lim
m↓m
V (Pm).
Then
i. if m ∈M , the government’s equilibrium payoff is V . In equilibrium, when θ > m, there
are no attacks and the peg is maintained; and when θ ≤ m, every speculator attacks the
currency and the peg is abandoned. The government can achieve the payoff V with the
two-interval partition Pm = {0,m, 1}.
ii. if m /∈ M , no equilibrium exists. However, the government can achieve a payoff arbi-
trarily close to V .
Proof: See Appendix A.2.10. 
The optimal policy involves setting m as low as possible, up to the limit where not attacking
is the unique equilibrium action for speculators on (m, 1]. Note that for any m close enough
to m21 any disclosure policy with yN = (m, 1] yields the same payoff for the government,
regardless of the signal structure when θ ∈ [0,m]. It is still true that when θ > m, there is
no attack and the peg is maintained; and when θ ≤ m, every speculator attacks the currency
and the peg is abandoned. Thus the government could be arbitrarily precise when the state
21That is, m ∈ (m, θ¯).
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of fundamentals is very bad, but when the state is “not too bad” the government needs
to be vague. This vagueness is used by the government to make the speculators uncertain
about whether the state is intermediate (where a coordinated attack is profitable) or good
(when attacking is never profitable), preventing them from attacking.
1.4.4. Vagueness
We conclude this section by showing that, even if the government could fully disclose the
state, it would not be optimal to do so.
In Lemma 18 (Appendix A.2.9), we show that that m < θ¯. Since m < θ¯, there exists m ∈
M∩(m, θ¯) such that the partition Pm = {0,m, 1} is strictly preferred to full disclosure. If the
state is fully revealed, in the worst equilibrium for the government, speculators coordinate
on attacking whenever θ < θ¯. With the partition Pm, the government eliminates currency
attacks between (m, θ¯). This leads to Proposition 1.
Proposition 1 Full disclosure of the state is not an optimal policy for the government.
1.5. No commitment
In this section, we drop the assumption that the government can commit to a disclosure
policy. Here the government chooses the public signal after observing the true state θ. For
simplicity, the government’s strategy in the last stage of the game is taken as given.
The game between government and speculators becomes a signaling game, where θ can be
interpreted as the government’s type. A strategy for the government is a function y : Θ→
Θ2 such that when the state is θ, the public signal is y(θ) = [y(θ), y(θ)] and speculators
learn that θ ∈ [y, y].22 As before, we require that the government must make truthful
announcements, that is, y(θ) ≤ θ ≤ y(θ) for all θ. Note that, if the government is not
restricted to truthful announcements, there exists an equilibrium in which the speculators
ignore the public signal. In this case, the equilibrium outcome is the same as the one in the
22The restriction to closed intervals is made only for simplicity.
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game without a public signal. (And, possibly, there are even worse equilibria.)
A strategy for speculators is a function that gives, for every private signal x and every public
signal, the corresponding action to be taken (attack or not). As before, let pi(x, y) be the
aggregate selling strategy. The equilibrium concept in this section is the Perfect Bayesian
Equilibrium (PBE) with symmetric strategies for the speculators.
Definition. The strategy profile (y, pi) is a PBE if
1. for all θ ∈ [0, 1], y(θ) maximizes the government’s payoff given pi;
2. for each possible signal y, there exist beliefs µx,y about θ such that pi(x, y) maximizes
the speculator’s expected payoff given µx,y, the aggregate strategy pi, and signals x
and y;
3. for each signal y such that
∫
{θ˜:y(θ˜)=y} 1dθ˜ > 0,
µx,y(θ) =

1
σ
g(x−θ
σ
)∫
{θ˜:y(θ˜)=y} 1dθ˜
, if y(θ) = y
0, otherwise
. (1.14)
4. for each signal y such that
∫
{θ˜:y(θ˜)=y} 1dθ˜ = 0
support(µx,y(θ)) ⊂ [x− ε, x+ ε] ∩ y (1.15)
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Consider the following profile of (y, pi, µ):
y(θ) ={θ}, ∀θ,
µx,y(θ) =
 1, if θ = max{x− ε, y}0, otherwise
pi(x, y) =
 1, if max{x− ε, y} ≤ θ¯0, otherwise .
In equilibrium, the public signal reveals the true state of the fundamentals, and speculators
attack if and only if θ < θ¯. Since θ∗ < θ¯, the government is ex ante strictly worse off
compared to the unique equilibrium of the game without a public signal. Furthermore, for
all types θ the equilibrium payoff is weakly smaller.
To see that (y, pi) is in fact an equilibrium with beliefs µ, first consider speculator i’s problem.
If y = y = θ, given that speculators follow pi, it is only profitable for i to attack if y < θ¯,
which means that pi is optimal on path. Now consider off path signals where y < y. When
y ≥ θ¯, the speculators know that θ ≥ θ¯ and attacking is indeed not profitable. If y < θ¯ and
speculator i receives a private signal xi ≤ θ¯ + ε, he believes that θ = max{x − ε, y} < θ¯.
The speculator also believes that everyone else received a private signal below θ¯ + ε, and
if aggregate sales are given by pi, the speculator believes that other speculators will attack.
Hence, attacking is profitable given µ, pi, xi, and y. Finally, if y < θ¯ and xi > θ¯ + ε, the
speculator knows that θ ≥ θ¯, and it is not profitable to attack. Thus, following pi is optimal
when y < θ¯ and xi > θ¯ + ε.
Now we show that strategy y is optimal for the government given pi and µ. Suppose that
the government has a profitable deviation from y for some type θ′ ∈ [0, 1].23 Since there
is no attack for θ ≥ θ¯, there can only be a profitable deviation if θ′ < θ¯. According to µ,
speculators believe that θ < θ¯ and attack. Thus, there is no profitable deviation from y.
23A deviation here is a signal signal y = [y, y], with y < y and θ′ ∈ [y, y].
29
The PBE above passes the intuitive criterion of Cho and Kreps (1987). Note that only types
in [0, θ¯) could benefit from a deviation. However, if the speculators know that θ < θ¯, they
can coordinate on attacking the currency peg, thus a deviation would not be profitable.
This example shows that commitment is essential for the government to benefit from a public
signal. When only truthful announcements are allowed, the speculators can exploit the fact
that the government wants to reveal its type for θ ≥ θ¯. In this case, speculators are able to
coordinate on attacking the currency peg whenever θ < θ¯. If the government is allowed to
lie, the speculators can simply ignore the public signal. The results are summarized in the
following proposition.
Proposition 2 Suppose that the government only cares about its lowest equilibrium pay-
off. If the government cannot commit to a disclosure policy, then it does not benefit from
sending a public signal. Furthermore, when only truthful announcements are allowed, the
government is strictly worse off with the introduction of a public signal.
1.6. Conclusion
This paper analyzes a model of currency attacks in which the government sends a credible
public signal about the fundamentals of the economy. The government can partition the
space of fundamentals and reveal in which interval the unknown state lies. The introduction
of a public signal generates partial common knowledge about the fundamentals and it
can lead to multiple equilibria. We find informative policies that strictly dominate no
disclosure even if multiplicity arises. We also derive the optimal policy by assuming that
the government only cares about the worst equilibrium outcome of each policy.
We find that sending very precise public signals can be harmful to the government. In fact,
for any signal structure, there exists a two-signal policy that is preferred by the govern-
ment. The optimal disclosure policy thus partitions the space of fundamentals into two
intervals. In the lower interval, speculators coordinate on attacking the currency and the
peg is abandoned; in the higher interval, no speculator attacks and the peg is maintained.
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The government is deliberately vague in order to induce speculators not to attack the cur-
rency in the higher interval. After the public signal reveals that the state is in the higher
interval, speculators are not sure whether a coordinated attack is profitable or not, thus
they refrain from attacking. If the government had chosen a finer partition, with more pre-
cise signals, speculators could have been able to coordinate on attacking for a wider range
of fundamentals, making a devaluation more likely.
When the government cannot commit to a disclosure policy, we find equilibria in which the
government is made worse off by sending a public signal. Thus commitment is key for the
government to benefit from disclosing information.
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CHAPTER 2 : REPUTATION AND TRANSPARENCY
2.1. Introduction
I develop a model where short-term reputation concerns determine the public disclosure of
information about the state of the economy, and then analyze its welfare effects in a coor-
dination environment. When governments are privately informed about a payoff-relevant
state, concerns for reputation might prevent them from truthfully disclosing the informa-
tion. If the distribution of states is related to the government’s type, the public information
can be biased towards the state that is more likely under the agents’ preferred type. The
disclosure policy thus creates a bias in the agents’ beliefs about the state, which affects
their actions in equilibrium. When there is complementarity in the actions, it is possible
that biased beliefs actually improve welfare in certain states.
There are efficient and inefficient governments, with privately known types, and both want
to maximize their reputation for being efficient. The two types differ in their ability to
generate the high and low productivity states. The high state is more likely when the
government is efficient rather than inefficient. There is an underlying assumption that an
unobservable and costly action can be taken to increase the probability of the high state,
and only the efficient governments are willing to take that action. Governments learn the
state and report it to entrepreneurs through a public signal. The reports are said to be
truthful if they match the state, and they are false otherwise. The entrepreneurs rely on
public information − the reports about the state and the realized productivity − to update
their beliefs about the government.
Each period, entrepreneurs in the model can borrow in a competitive credit market to invest
in a new venture, and there is complementarity in investment. Ventures face a common
probability of failure, and entrepreneurs receive private signals about it. Conditional on
success, the productivity of the ventures depends on the state of the economy. In equilib-
rium, given the public signal about the state, entrepreneurs follow a cutoff rule and invest if
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their private signals are high enough. The extent to which investment decisions respond to
the public report depends on the government’s reputation and on how truthful the public
disclosure policy is. The more entrepreneurs believe that the state is high, the higher is
their equilibrium cutoff given the public signal, and the more likely they are to invest.
In any equilibrium, the government’s reputation evolves gradually over time, and en-
trepreneurs are never certain about the government’s type − the distribution of productivity
has the same support in both states. There is no equilibrium where the inefficient govern-
ment follows a full disclosure policy. If the inefficient government were always truthful, the
efficient government would respond by making false reports to distinguish itself from the
inefficient type. This creates incentives for the inefficient government to deviate from full
disclosure to be perceived as the efficient type. I focus on the equilibrium where the efficient
government follows a full disclosure policy. In this equilibrium, the inefficient government
is too optimistic: it is truthful in the high state, but in the low state it randomizes between
true and false reports. The inefficient government’s reports are thus biased toward the high
state, which is more likely under the efficient type.
When the government reports a low state, entrepreneurs are certain that the state is indeed
low, and their beliefs about the expected productivity are not biased. Following a report
of a high state, entrepreneurs are not sure about the true state and their beliefs are biased:
they overestimate productivity in the low state, and underestimate it in the high state. The
higher is the trust in the government’s announcement, the higher is the equilibrium level of
investment when a report of a high state is sent. If the true state is high, welfare is increasing
in the entrepreneurs’ trust in the government, and welfare is maximized when entrepreneurs
are sure of the state. However, in the low state there is a tradeoff when the inefficient
government sends a false report: there are complementarity gains to all entrepreneurs from
a higher level of investment, and potential losses to the marginal entrepreneurs due to the
overestimation of productivity. As long as entrepreneurs do not place too much trust in
the government’s report, the bias is small enough and the net effect is positive for welfare.
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When the trust in the public signal increases, false reports induce too much investment and
reduce welfare in the low state.
Related literature.
This paper relates to the literature in which, due to reputation concerns, agents with pri-
vately known types may modify their actions to affect other agents’ beliefs about their type
(see Mailath and Samuelson (2001)). Here, I focus on the government’s incentives to send
optimistic signals to be perceived as an efficient type, even if that results in lower welfare.
In contrast to what is commonly assumed in the literature of government reputation (see,
for example, Barro and Gordon (1983) and Phelan (2006)), the government here cannot
take actions that directly affect the agents’ payoffs; it can only disclose information about
payoff-relevant states, and actions cannot reveal the government’s type. 1
This paper is closely related to Herrera et al. (2015). They show that, for emerging
economies, the rise in governments’ popularity is a better predictor of financial crises than
other better-known indicators, such as credit booms (see, for example, Mendoza and Ter-
rones (2012) and Schularick and Taylor (2012)). The paper argues that governments in
emerging economies are more concerned with their reputation and choose to enjoy the
short-term popularity benefits of weak credit booms rather than implementing costly poli-
cies that would reduce the probability that such booms end in crises. They develop a model
where booms can be good (sustainable) or bad (unsustainable), and the policy that max-
imizes welfare is the regulation of bad booms, and no regulation of good booms. There is
a good government, which always acts optimally, and a bad government that is strategic
and wants to maximize its reputation for being good. Since the good boom is more likely
under the good government, the bad governments will not always regulate bad booms, as
regulation reveals that the boom is not sustainable and it negatively impacts the govern-
ment’s reputation. In my model, I assume that the government cannot directly affect the
1Here, the government is not trying to convince agents that it will not behave opportunistically and take
an action that negatively affects their payoffs (such as increasing capital taxes). Instead, the government is
trying to show the agents that it can generate the high productivity states more often.
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outcome in the economy; the welfare effects of the public disclosure policy depend on how
agents respond to it. As in Herrera et al. (2015), a large increase in reputation can be a
bad sign for welfare in my model. When the inefficient government sends false reports with
high probability, agents do not trust reports of a high productivity state. Thus, if the gov-
ernment sends a false report, it is not believed and there is only a small rise in reputation,
followed by a small increase in credit and investment, which is welfare improving because
of the complementarity in investment. However, when the inefficient government is not
likely to make false reports, agents trust the public signal. In this case, following a false
report in the low productivity state, there is large increase in reputation and a high level
of investment, which decreases welfare. If entrepreneurs are required to borrow in order
to invest, this results in a high probability of default, which can be interpreted as a credit
crisis.
The paper also relates to the literature on pandering. For instance, Maskin and Tirole
(2004) analyze a model where politicians might have the same preferences as the electorate
or not, and their type is privately known. They show that when a politician has strong
motives to remain in office, she always takes the popular action (the ex ante optimal action
for the voters), even if she knows that the action is not optimal, and regardless of her type.
The politician thus panders to public opinion because she wants to build a reputation for
being the type that has the same preferences as the voters. In a different setting, a similar
result is presented in Brandenburger and Polak (1996). They show that when a manager
is concerned with the market’s perception about his actions, he will distort his investment
decision toward an investment that the market believes is ex ante more likely to succeed. In
my model, instead of a privately informed government making decisions, I have agents that
choose their actions based a public signal, and the government’s type affects the distribution
of payoff relevant states. The disclosure policy follows the same logic of pandering: when
the efficient government is truthful, the inefficient government sends signals that are biased
toward the state that agents believe is more likely when the government is efficient.
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Finally, the paper is related to the literature on global games of regime change. The
model can be interpreted as having two regimes: the default is a low productivity regime;
and if the level of investment is high enough, there is a switch to a high productivity
regime. By investing, entrepreneurs are attacking the low productivity regime, and the
probability of failure is assumed to affect the success of the attack. In each period, the game
between entrepreneurs is similar to the one in Morris and Shin (1998), who study a model
of self-fulfilling currency attacks when the fundamentals that determine payoffs are not
common knowledge among entrepreneurs. The equivalent to their state of the fundamentals
in my model is the venture’s probability of failure. As in Morris and Shin (1998), the
game between entrepreneurs has a unique equilibrium when the noise in the entrepreneurs’
private information is small enough, and the equilibrium investment strategies also follows a
cutoff rule based on their private signals. Deviation from common knowledge is key for the
uniqueness of equilibrium. My model departs from Morris and Shin (1998) by introducing
another state variable that affects the payoffs in case of a regime change, and a government
that sends public signals about that variable (the state of the economy in the current paper,
which affects the productivity of the ventures). The introduction of public policy in such
coordination environments, and its signaling effects, have been extensively studied in the
literature (see, for example, Angeletos et al. (2006), Angeletos and Pavan (2007, 2009) and
Angeletos and Pavan (2013)). Breaking the uniqueness result in Morris and Shin (1998),
Angeletos et al. (2006) point out that policy interventions that convey some information
about the fundamentals may lead to multiple equilibria. In contrast to Angeletos et al.
(2006), the public policy in my model does not lead to multiplicity. This is the case because
there is no public information about the state that affects the success of an attack, only
about the state that determines payoffs conditional on the regime change. The public signal
only affects the entrepreneurs’ cutoff rule: the cutoff is increasing in the probability that
entrepreneurs assign to the high productivity state.
Structure of the paper. The remainder of this paper is divided as follows. Section 2.2
presents the model and the equilibrium disclosure policy for the government is characterized
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in Section 2.3. Section 2.4 analyzes the entrepreneurs’ equilibrium investment strategies,
and the welfare effects of the public policy. Section 2.5 concludes the paper and discusses
extensions to the model. Appendix A.4 analyzes the model when entrepreneurs are require
to borrow in a competitive credit market to star a new venture. Furthermore, it presents
conditions under which the two models have the same equilibrium investment strategies for
the entrepreneurs. The proofs that are omitted in the main text are presented in Appendix
A.3.
2.2. The Model
2.2.1. Actions and payoffs
Time is discrete and indexed by t ∈ {1, 2, ...}. There is a continuum of entrepreneurs of
measure one, who are indexed by i and uniformly distributed on [0, 1]. They are infinitely-
lived, risk-neutral profit maximizers. Each period, entrepreneurs have an endowment of
one unit of labor, which can be used to start up a new, risky, venture, or to work for a
fixed wage w.2 For simplicity, there is no capital in the model, only labor. Appendix A.4
analyzes the model when new ventures also require one unit of capital, which is borrowed
in a perfectly competitive credit market. In the model with capital, there is an equilibrium
where the investment decisions are the same as in the baseline model without capital. 3
The ventures have a common probability of failure θt, which is drawn every period from
a uniform distribution on Θ = [θmin, θmax]. The total number of ventures in period t is
denoted by nt. In case of success, at the end of period t the venture pays
v, if nt < N(θt),
2The wage w can be seen as the payoff from choosing a safe rather than a risky venture.
3For that result, the opportunity cost of a venture must be the same in both models. Without capital,
the opportunity cost is w, the cost of labor. With capital, the opportunity cost is 1 + r + w˜, the cost of
labor plus capital, where r and w˜ are the risk-free rate and the wage in the model with capital. Therefore,
we need that w = 1 + r + w˜.
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and
v + δt, if nt ≥ N(θt),
where N(·) < 1 is weakly increasing in θ, with a continuous derivative N ′(·). The produc-
tivity of the ventures is thus increased by δt > 0 if the aggregate investment is high enough.
Failed ventures are assumed to pay nothing.
Each period, the productivity parameter δ depends on a state variable s ∈ S = {H,L}.
Given st, δt is follows a distribution with probability density function fst and mean δst . It
is assumed that
suppfH = suppfL = ∆ = [δmin, δmax],
in which case the realization of δ never reveals the state. State H is associated with higher
productivity, as described in the assumption below.
Assumption 2 The likelihood ratio λ(δ) ≡ fH(δ)/fL(δ) is continuously differentiable, in-
creasing in δ, and it is strictly increasing for δ ∈ (δ1, δ2) ⊆ [δmin, δmax], where δ1 < δ2.
Assumption 1 implies that δH > δL.
There is also a government in this economy, which can be efficient (type E) or inefficient
(type I), and the types are private information. It is assumed that the type is permanent
and the same government remains in power forever. The types only differ in their ability
to generate the high productivity state H. Each period, high productivity states are more
likely when the government is efficient:
piE ≡ Pr(st = H|E) > piB ≡ Pr(st = H|I), for all t.
The government knows the state and can report it through a public signal yt ∈ Y = {h, l}.4
4There are two interpretations for the disclosure policy. One is that the government observes st and
sends a (possibly random) public signal y(st). Another interpretation is that the government follows an
information acquisition procedure and, if the state is st, the outcome is a (possibly random) public signal
y(st). The latter is in line with the Bayesian persuasion literature (see, for example, Kamenica and Gentzkow
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We say that the report is truthful if either yt = h when st = H, or yt = l when st = L,
and it is false otherwise. The government’s reputation at the beginning of period t is
denoted by µt, which is the probability that entrepreneurs assign to the efficient type E.
The government’s payoff at period t is given by µt+1, the updated reputation at the end of
the period, after entrepreneurs observe yt and δt. Both types, E and I are strategic, and
their goal in each period is to maximize the expected value of µt. The governments are
assumed to be myopic and only care about their reputation at the end of the period.5
2.2.2. Timing and information
At period t = 1, nature draws the government’s type from {E, I} Entrepreneurs enter
period t = 1 with a common prior µ1 about the government’s type. At the beginning of
period t, nature draws the probability of failure θt ∈ Θ and the state st ∈ {H,L}. The
government observes s and sends a public signal yt ∈ {h, l} about the state. Entrepreneurs
then form beliefs about the state and the expected value of δt. The expected value of δt
is δ¯t = P(s = H|µt, yt)δH + P(s = L|µt, yt)δL ∈ [δL, δH ]. Entrepreneur i also receives a
private signal xt,i about θt. After observing the private and public signals, entrepreneurs
simultaneously decide whether to invest or to work. Given st, nature draws the productivity
parameter δ from a distribution with probability density function fst . At the end of the
period, the outcomes of all ventures are publicly observed, payoffs are received, and the
government’s reputation is updated to µt+1. The structure of the game is assumed to be
common knowledge.
Given θt, entrepreneur i receives a private signal xt,i ∈ X = [θmin − ε, θmax + ε], where
xt,i = θt + εt,i.
(2011)). In this case, the government is not more informed than the entrepreneurs when the public signal is
sent.
5The government in this model can be seen as a party (efficient or inefficient) that is perpetually in power.
Each period there is a different member of the party who runs the government (the current president). She
only cares maximizing the reputation of the party while she is charge, and future reputation is not a concern.
Extensions where the government can be replaced and care about future reputation are discussed Section
2.5.
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The idiosyncratic noise εt,i is drawn from a distribution with probability density function
g(·), and cumulative distribution function G(·). Each εt,i is independently and identically
distributed across entrepreneurs and independent of θt. I assume that supp(g) = [−ε, ε],
with ε > 0, and 2ε < min{θ − θmin, θmax − θ¯δH}. Function g(·) is differentiable on (−ε, ε),
and its derivative, g′(·), is assumed to be bounded and such that6
if g′(ε˜) < 0, then g′(εˆ) ≤ 0 ∀εˆ ∈ (ε˜, ε). (2.1)
The posterior distribution of θ given private signal x has probability density function φ(θ|x),
where
φ(θ|x) = g(x− θ)
G (x− θmin)−G (x− θmax) . (2.2)
The derivation of φ(θ|x) is presented in Appendix A.2.7
At the end of the period, entrepreneurs might observe the realization of δ and use it to
update their beliefs about the government. There are two alternative frameworks.
Assumption 3-A At the end of the period, the realization of δ is always publicly observed.
Assumption 3-B The realization of δ is publicly observed when n ≥ N(θ), in which case
successful ventures pay v + δ. If n < N(θ), entrepreneurs do not observe δ.
In what follows, the results are true under both Assumption 3-A or Assumption 3-B, unless
the required assumption is clearly specified.
2.2.3. Equilibrium
I restrict attention to Markov strategies: for any t, t′, if µt = µt′ , the government and the
entrepreneurs follow the same strategies in periods t and t′. In other words, conditional on
6The assumptions on the structure of private signals are based on a previous work Galvao and Shalders
(2017). They guarantee that, conditional on the public signal, the game between entrepreneurs in each
period has a unique equilibrium.
7 There is a pair of values of x that fully reveals θ. If x = θmax +ε, we have P(θ = θmax|x = θmax +ε) = 1;
likewise, when x = θmin − ε, then P(θ = θmin|x = θmin − ε) = 1. For all other values of x, the conditional
density of θ is given by (2.2).
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the current beliefs about the government, the strategies are independent of the history of
actions, states, and outcomes that lead to those beliefs.
Remark: In this paper, the link between periods is the evolution of entrepreneurs’ beliefs
about the government. The per-period payoffs are independent of past and future actions,
states and outcomes, the government maximizes its expected reputation at the end of each
period, and I limit attention to equilibria in Markov strategies. I chose this highly styl-
ized dynamic game rather than a static one to capture the evolution of the government’s
reputation, and how it affects entrepreneurs’ strategies. In Section 2.5 I discuss possible
extensions that would make the dynamic game more realistic.
The efficient government’s strategy for period t is denoted by pE : [0, 1]× S → [0, 1], where
pE(µt, s) is the probability that the efficient government sends a signal y = h, given that the
prior reputation is µt and the current state is s.
8 Similarly, the inefficient government’s
strategy for period t is denoted by pI : [0, 1] × S → [0, 1]. Entrepreneurs beliefs about
the productivity parameter δ are given by δ¯ : [0, 1] × Y → [δL, δH ], where δ¯(µt, y) is the
expected value of δ given that a government with reputation µt has sent a public signal y.
Entrepreneur i’s strategy for period t is given by ai : [δL, δH ]×X → {0, 1}, where ai(δ¯, xi) =
1 represents investing and ai(δ¯, xi) = 0 represents working, given a private signal xi and δ¯.
9
The government’s reputation at the end of period t is given by µt+1 : [0, 1] × Y × Θ ×∆,
where µt+1(µt, y, θ, δ) is the probability that entrepreneurs assign to the efficient type if a
government of reputation µt sends a signal y, and the observed productivity is δ.
The equilibrium concept here is perfect Bayesian equilibrium (PBE). Given a common prior
µ1, a PBE consists of entrepreneurs’ beliefs µt, strategies for types E, pE , for type I, pI , and
for the continuum of entrepreneurs, {ai}i∈[0,1], such that beliefs are updated using Bayes
rule whenever possible10 and, given the beliefs, no player has an incentive to deviate.
8Given the restriction to Markov strategies, I drop the subscript t, except for the reputation µt.
9It is assumed that entrepreneurs invest whenever indifferent, thus ai ∈ {0, 1}.
10 In this setting, government’s deviations from equilibrium are only observable if, for a prior reputation
µt, both types send either yt = h or yt = l with probability 1, regardless of the true state st. Apart from
the case of observable deviations, entrepreneurs use Bayes rule to update their beliefs.
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2.3. Optimal Disclosure Policy
This section characterizes the equilibrium disclosure policies at period t. At the beginning
of period t, the prior reputation is given by µt, the probability that entrepreneurs assign to
the efficient type at the end of period t− 1. The efficient government’s strategy for period t
is given by pE(µt, s), which denotes the probability that type E sends a signal y = h given
µt and state s. Similarly, the inefficient type I’s strategy is given by pI(µt, s). Both types
follow disclosure policies that maximize their expected reputation at the end of the period,
µt+1.
An equilibrium profile for time t consists of strategies pE and pI for types E and I, and
beliefs and strategies for the entrepreneurs, such that beliefs are obtained using Bayes rule
whenever possible11 and, given the beliefs, no player has an incentive to deviate. This section
characterizes the entrepreneurs’ beliefs and the equilibrium strategies for the government.
The equilibrium strategies for the entrepreneurs are characterized in Section 2.4.
There exist the trivial equilibria in which both types send either y = h or y = l regardless
of the state. These equilibria are supported by the belief that the government is inefficient
whenever a deviation is observed. There is no equilibrium in which the inefficient type I
follows a full disclosure policy, i.e., where the reports are always truthful: y = h in state H,
and y = l in state L. This result is formalized in Lemma 19, in Appendix A.2. Intuitively, if
the inefficient government were always truthful, the efficient government would respond by
making false reports to distinguish itself from the inefficient type. This creates incentives
for the inefficient government to deviate from full disclosure to be perceived as the efficient
type.
There exist equilibria where the efficient government follows a full disclosure policy. In what
follows, I restrict attention to such equilibria. First, the efficient government is assumed to
11See footnote 10
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follow
pE(µt, H) = 1− pE(µt, L) = 1, for all µt.
Then the best response of the inefficient government is characterized. Finally, I check
whether this is an equilibrium strategy profile for period t.
2.3.1. Reputation
Given µt and the governments’ strategies, entrepreneurs update beliefs using Bayes rule.
First, entrepreneurs form intermediate beliefs following the public signal y and make in-
vestment decisions. Then, conditional on observing a realization of δ, entrepreneurs update
the reputation to µt+1. If the government sends a public signal y = h, the entrepreneur’s
intermediate update about the government’s reputation is
µh(µt) =
piEµt
piEµt + [piIpI(µt, H) + (1− piI)pI(µt, L)] (1− µt) . (2.3)
If y = l, the intermediate update is
µl(µt) =
(1− piE)µt
(1− piE)µt + [piI(1− pI(µt, H)) + (1− piI)(1− pI(µt, L))] (1− µt) . (2.4)
Given the public signal y, entrepreneurs form beliefs about the expected value of δ. If y = h,
the expectation of δ is
δ¯(µt, h) =
[
µh(µt) + (1− µh(µt)) piIpI(µt, H)
piIpI(µt, H) + (1− piI)pI(µt, L)
]
δH
+
[
(1− µh(µt)) (1− piI)pI(µt, L)
piIpI(µt, H) + (1− piI)pI(µt, L)
]
δL, (2.5)
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and if y = l,
δ¯(µt, l) =
[
(1− µl(µt)) piI(1− pI(µt, H))
piI(1− pI(µt, H)) + (1− piI)(1− pI(µt, L))
]
δH
+
[
µl(µt) + (1− µl(µt)) (1− piI)(1− pI(µt, L))
piI(1− pI(µt, H)) + (1− piI)(1− pI(µt, L))
]
δL. (2.6)
After investment decisions are made and the outcomes of all ventures are observed, en-
trepreneurs might observe δ. If y = h and δ is observed, the government’s updated reputa-
tion is
µhδ (µt) =
piEµt
piEµt +
[
piIpI(µt, H) +
fL(δ)
fH(δ)
(1− piI)pI(µt, L)
]
(1− µ)
. (2.7)
From Assumption 2, the likelihood ratio fH(δ)/fL(δ) is increasing in δ, thus µ
h
δ is also
increasing in δ. The higher is δ, the more likely it is that the true state is H and that the
report y = h is truthful. Since type E is always truthful, the reputation increases in δ.
If y = l and δ is observed, the updated reputation is
µlδ(µt) =
(1− piE)µt
(1− piE)µt +
[
fH(δ)
fL(δ)
piI(1− pI(µt, H)) + (1− piI)(1− pI(µt, L))
]
(1− µt)
. (2.8)
From Assumption 2, µlδ is decreasing in δ. As δ increases, it less likely that the true state
is L and that the report y = l is truthful, therefore the reputation decreases.
Under Assumption 3-A, the realization of δ is always observed at the end of the period. In
this case, the government’s reputation at the end of the period is given by
µt+1(µt, y, θ, δ) = µ
y
δ(µt), for all µt, y, θ, δ. (2.9)
Given prior reputation µt and state s, the expected reputation by sending signal y is
µ¯t(µt, s, y) = Eδ[µt+1(µt, y, θ, δ)|s]. (2.10)
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Under Assumption 3-B, the realization of δ is only observed when the number of ventures
is greater than N(θ), in which case successful ventures pay v + δ. After observing y,
entrepreneurs compute the expected value of δ, δ¯(µt, y), observe their private signals xi and
make their investment decisions, which are characterized in Section 2.4. From Proposition 4
in Section 2.4, the higher is the entrepreneurs expectation of δ, the higher is the equilibrium
number of ventures, n, and the higher is the probability that δ is observed. It follows from
Proposition 4 in Section 2.4 that, under Assumption 3-B, the government’s reputation at
the end of the period is given by
µt+1(µt, y, θ, δ) =
 µ
y
δ(µt), if θ ≤ θ∗(δ¯(µt, y))
µy(µt), if θ > θ
∗(δ¯(µt, y))
. (2.11)
The probability of δ being observed is P(θ ≤ θ∗(δ¯(µt, y))) ≡ P ∗(µt, y). Given a prior µt and
a state s, the government’s expected reputation from sending a signal y is
µ¯t(µt, s, y) = P
∗(µt, y)Eδ[µyδ(µt)|s] + [1− P ∗(µt, y)]µy(µt). (2.12)
The government’s objective is to maximize µ¯t. The expected payoff gain from being truthful
in state H and sending a signal h rather than a signal l is given by
GH = µ¯t(µt, H, h)− µ¯t(µt, H, l). (2.13)
The gain from being truthful in state L is given by
GL = µ¯t(µt, L, l)− µ¯t(µt, L, h). (2.14)
2.3.2. Equilibrium policy
In any equilibrium where the efficient type follows a full disclosure policy, the inefficient
type will truthfully disclose the high productivity state H, as stated in the lemma below.
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Lemma 9 Let µt = µ ∈ (0, 1). If the efficient government follows full disclosure, then the
inefficient government is truthful when s = H:
pI(µ,H) = 1.
The proof is in Appendix A.2. Intuitively, there are two reasons for the inefficient govern-
ment to be truthful in state H when the efficient government is always truthful. When
entrepreneurs observe a signal h, they believe that it is more likely that the government is
efficient, since state H is more likely when the government is efficient. The second reason
is that, if the government sends y = l and entrepreneurs observe a realization of δ that is
more likely under state H, they will assign a high probability to a false report, which only
happens if the government is inefficient. Thus, by sending a signal h, the inefficient govern-
ment increases both its reputation prior to the realization of δ and the expected reputation
conditional on δ being observed.
Since the inefficient government is truthful in the high productivity state, there can only
be false reports in the low productivity state. In what follows, denote by pµ the probability
that the inefficient government sends a signal h in state L (pµ ≡ pI(µ,L)). We can write
the gain from making truthful reports in state L, given by (2.14), as a function GL(µ, pµ).
Lemma 10 GL(µ, pµ) has the following properties:
(i) GL(0, p) = GL(1, p) = 0, for all p ∈ [0, 1].
(ii) GL(µ, 0) < 0, for all µ ∈ (0, 1).
(iii) GL(µ, 1) > 0, for all µ ∈ (0, 1).
(iv) Under Assumption 3-A, GL(µ, 0) is strictly convex in µ.
From part (i) of Lemma 10, when entrepreneurs are sure about the government’s type, the
inefficient government has no incentives to make false reports in the low productivity state.
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However, from part (ii), incentives arise when there is uncertainty about the government’s
type. Part (iii), shows that the incentives to lie disappear when the probability of false
reports, pµ, becomes too high. Finally, parts (i), (ii), and (iv) imply that, under Assumption
3-A, the gain from always being truthful in state L, GL(µ, 0), is U-shaped in µ: starting
from GL(0, 0) = 0, GL(µ, 0) first decreases in µ, then it increases to reach GL(1, 0) = 0.
The incentives for the inefficient government to make false reports are thus highest for
intermediate values of the prior reputation.
From Lemma 10 we get the following result.
Lemma 11 Let µt = µ ∈ (0, 1). If the efficient type follows full disclosure, then the
inefficient government sends y = l with positive probability in state L:
pµ ∈ (0, 1),
where pµ is such that GL(µ, pµ) = 0. If Assumption 3-A holds, there exists a unique
p∗µ ∈ (0, 1) that solves GL(µ, pµ) = 0.
Given the inefficient government’s response to the efficient government’s full disclosure
policy, it is left to show that the efficient government has no incentives to deviate, and that
the strategy profile is indeed an equilibrium for period t. This result is described in the
following proposition.
Proposition 3 Let µt = µ ∈ (0, 1). There exists an equilibrium where, in period t, the
efficient government follows a full disclosure policy and the inefficient government sets
pI(µt, H) = 1,
and
pI(µ,L) = pµ ∈ (0, 1),
where pµ solves GL(µ, pµ) = 0.
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If Assumption 3-A holds, there exists a unique p∗µ that solves GL(µ, pµ) = 0.
2.4. Investment and Welfare
This section analyzes the entrepreneurs’ equilibrium strategies for period t, and the equi-
librium levels of investment and welfare. Given a public signal y and prior reputation µt,
entrepreneurs form expectations about δ, as described in (2.5) and (2.6), to make investment
decisions. Here, I fix the expected value of δ at δ¯(µt, y) = δ¯.
2.4.1. Investment
As mention in Section 2.2.3, given the restriction to Markov strategies, the entrepreneur
i’s strategy only depends on the current private signal xi and on δ¯. Hence, conditional
on δ¯, the game between the entrepreneurs in each period is similar to the one in Morris
and Shin (1998). In their paper, entrepreneurs decide whether to attack a currency or not
based on their private signals about the fundamentals of the economy. In the current paper,
given δ¯, entrepreneurs decide whether to invest or to work given their private signals about
the venture’s probability of failure. For a given probability of failure θ, and a given δ¯, an
entrepreneur’s expected payoff from investing is
(1− θ)v, if n < N(θ),
and
(1− θ)(v + δ¯), if n ≥ N(θ).
Denote by θ the value of θ that solves (1−θ)v = w. If θ < θ, it is optimal to invest even if no
other entrepreneur is investing. Denote by θ¯(δ¯) the value of θ that solves (1−θ)(v+ δ¯) = w.
If θ > θ¯(δ¯), it is not optimal to invest even if all entrepreneurs are investing. To simplify
the notation, let θ¯H ≡ θ¯(δH), and θ¯L ≡ θ¯(δL).
When there is common knowledge about the probability of failure, Θ can be divided in
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three intervals12, as is standard in the literature of self-fulfilling equilibria:13
• if θ ∈ [θmin, θ): it is always profitable to invest;
• if θ ∈ (θ, θ¯(δ¯)): coordinated investment is profitable and, if entrepreneurs coordinate
on not investing, investment is not profitable;
• if θ ∈ (θ¯(δ¯), θmax]: it is never profitable to invest.
As the expected value of δ, δ¯, increases, the threshold θ¯(δ¯) also increases. This means
that there are more values of θ for which coordinated investment is profitable (the middle
interval grows to the right), and there are fewer values of θ that prevent investment from
being profitable (the upper interval shrinks).
Now we turn to the equilibrium with private information about θ. Conditional on δ¯, an
equilibrium for the game between the entrepreneurs in period t consists of strategies such
that no entrepreneur has an incentive to deviate. For a given profile of strategies for the
entrepreneurs, the measure of entrepreneurs who invest given δ¯ and a private signal x is
denoted by η(δ¯, x). Given a probability of failure θ, the number of ventures is then
n(δ¯, θ, η) =
∫ θ+ε
θ−ε
η(δ¯, x)g (x− θ) dx. (2.15)
Conditional on success, the expected productivity of a venture is increased by δ¯ when
n(δ¯, θ, η) ≥ N(θ). (2.16)
12It is assumed that
• v > w;
• θ = 1− w/v > θmin;
• θ¯H = 1− w/[v + δH ] < θmax.
13See, for example, Obstfeld (1996) and Morris and Shin (1998) in the case of self-fulfilling currency
attacks.
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Thus, the event where a venture’s expected payoff is v + δ¯ is given by
A(δ¯, η) = {θ : n(δ¯, θ, η) ≥ N(θ)}. (2.17)
After observing xi, entrepreneur i’s expected payoff from investing is:
u(δ¯, xi, η) = v
∫ xi+ε
xi−ε
(1− θ)φ(θ|xi)dθ + δ¯
∫
[xi−ε,xi+ε]∩A(δ¯,η)
(1− θ)φ(θ|xi)dθ, (2.18)
where φ is given by (2.2). Entrepreneur i invests in equilibrium if:
u(δ¯, xi, η) ≥ w. (2.19)
The following proposition characterizes the unique equilibrium of the game played by the
entrepreneurs at time t, conditional on δ¯.
Proposition 4 Given δ¯, the equilibrium of the game between entrepreneurs in period t is
unique. The equilibrium strategy for the entrepreneurs is to invest if and only if their private
signal is
x ≤ x∗(δ¯).
The equilibrium number of ventures n is thus decreasing in θ. n ≥ N(θ) if and only if the
probability of failure is
θ ≤ θ∗(δ¯).
Both x∗(δ¯) and θ∗(δ¯) are increasing in δ¯.
The proof of Proposition 4 is in Appendix A.3. Entrepreneurs follow a cutoff rule and invest
if their private signal is below x∗(δ¯). Since x∗(δ¯) is increasing, for every θ the number of
ventures is increasing in the entrepreneurs’ expectation of δ. The cutoff rule leads to a
threshold probability of failure θ∗(δ¯), below which the total number of ventures is greater
than N(θ), and the successful ventures pay v + δ instead of v. Since the threshold θ∗(δ¯) is
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also increasing, the higher is the entrepreneurs’ expectation of δ, the higher is the probability
that ventures pay v + δ instead of v.
The entrepreneurs’ equilibrium strategy is thus
ai(δ¯, xi) = a
∗(δ¯, xi) =
 1, if xi ≤ x
∗(δ¯)
0, if xi > x
∗(δ¯)
. (2.20)
where x∗(δ¯) solves
u(δ¯, x∗(δ¯), a∗) = w, (2.21)
Equation (2.21) is the indifference condition for the entrepreneur who receives the cutoff
signal x∗(δ¯). In equilibrium, the total number of ventures is given by
n(δ¯, θ, a∗) = P(x ≤ x∗(δ¯)|θ) = G(x∗(δ¯)− θ).
2.4.2. Welfare
In state s, the mean value of δ is δs. If δ¯ 6= δs, the entrepreneurs’ expectation of the
productivity parameter is biased. The entrepreneurs’ expected welfare in state s is given
by14
Ws(δ¯) =(v + δs)
∫ θ∗(δ¯)
θmin
(1− θ)G(x∗(δ¯)− θ)dθ + v
∫ x∗(δ¯)+ε
θ∗(δ¯)
(1− θ)G(x∗ − θ)dθ
+ w
[∫ x∗(δ¯)+ε
x∗(δ¯)−ε
(1−G(x∗(δ¯)− θ))dθ +
∫ θmax
x∗(δ¯)+ε
dθ
]
. (2.22)
From Proposition 3, both types are truthful when the state is H, but the inefficient govern-
ment sends false reports with positive probability in state L. Following a signal y = l, en-
trepreneurs are sure that the true state is L, and there is no distortion in the entrepreneurs’
14θ is uniformly distributed on [θmin, θmax], therefore the density is constant at [1/(θmax − θmin)]. For
simplicity, I multiplied the welfare function by [θmax − θmin].
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expectation about δ: δ¯(µ, l) = δL for all µ ∈ (0, 1). However, when the government sends a
signal y = h, there is a distortion: δ¯(µ, l) ∈ (δL, δH) for all µ ∈ (0, 1). Entrepreneurs over-
estimate δ when the true state is L, and underestimate δ when the state is H. The higher
is the entrepreneurs’ trust in the public signal − their belief that the report is truthful,
and the state is H − the higher is δ¯. Hence, in state L the distortion increases with the
entrepreneurs’ trust a signal h (δ¯ gets further away from δL), while in state H the distortion
decreases with the entrepreneurs’ trust (δ¯ gets closer to δL).
If the true state is H, welfare is increasing in the entrepreneurs’ expectation of δ, and it is
maximized at δ¯ = δH (i.e., when the expectation is unbiased). This result is stated in the
following lemma.
Lemma 12 WH(δ¯) in increasing in δ¯, for all δ¯ ≤ δH .
The more entrepreneurs believe that the government is being truthful when sending y = h,
the higher is their expectation of δ and the more they are willing to invest. Lemma 12 thus
implies that, in the high productivity state, welfare is increasing in the entrepreneurs’ trust
in the public signal.
In the low productivity state L, welfare increases if the entrepreneurs’ expectation of δ is
slightly biased. Starting at δ¯ = δL, a marginal increase in the δ¯ increases WL. This result
is formalized in the following lemma.
Lemma 13 ∂WL(δ¯)
∂δ¯
> 0, at δ¯ = δL.
Lemma 13 shows that entrepreneurs might benefit from having biased expectation of δ in
state L. Biased expectations induce entrepreneurs to be more aggressive in their invest-
ment strategies and receive the complementarity gain δ more often. Complementarity in
investment is thus key to this result. However, as the bias increases, welfare might start to
decrease. This is the case when x∗(δH) > θ¯L+ε, which is true if (δH−δL) is large enough.15
15For example, if δH >
2ε(v+δL)
2
w−2ε(v+δL) .
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This result is presented in the following lemma.
Lemma 14 Suppose that x∗(δH) > θ¯L + ε. Then, there exists δ˜ ∈ (δL, δH) such that
∂WL(δ¯)
∂δ¯
< 0, for δ¯ ≥ δ˜.
The intuition for Lemmas 13 and 14 is the following. When δ¯ increases, entrepreneurs
expected payoff from investing also increases. This raises the equilibrium cutoff signal for
investing, x∗(δ¯), which in turn raises the threshold θ∗(δ¯), below which entrepreneurs receive
the productivity gain δ. When the true state is L, there is a tradeoff from raising the
cutoff: the marginal investors are worse off due to their biased expectation of δ; while all
entrepreneurs gain from the a higher level of investment. In equilibrium, there is more
investment when the probability of failure is low (θ < θ¯L), and it is optimal to invest, but
there there is also more investment when the probability of failure is high (θ > θ¯L), and
it is optimal to work. If the entrepreneurs’ expectation is biased, but close enough to θ¯L,
the positive effect dominates, and raising the cutoff increases welfare WL. However, when
the entrepreneurs’ expectation of δ is too biased, such that x∗(δ¯) > θ¯L + ε, the tradeoff
disappears and only the negative effect on WL remains: raising the cutoff only increases
investment when θ > θ¯L, and it is optimal to work.
Thus, when the true state is L, if entrepreneurs assign a small probability to state H, there
is a small increase in investment, which is welfare improving. As entrepreneurs become more
convinced that the state H when it is in fact L, welfare starts to decrease because there is
too much investment when the probability of failure is high, and working is optimal. This
means that, when entrepreneurs have little trust in the government’s report of y = h, the
inefficient government increases welfare by making a false report in state L. As the trust in
the false report increases, welfare will start to decrease. The welfare results are summarized
in the following proposition.
Proposition 5 In state H, welfare is increasing in the entrepreneurs’ trust in the public
signal. In state L, the inefficient government can increase welfare by making false reports
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if the trust in the public signal is low. As the trust in the public signal grows, welfare will
start to decrease.
2.5. Conclusion
This paper analyzed the effects of short-term reputation concerns in the disclosure of public
information in a coordination environment.
In equilibrium, when the efficient government is truthful, the inefficient government sends
signals that are too optimistic, making false reports of a high productivity state with positive
probability to be perceived as efficient. This creates a distortion in the entrepreneurs’ beliefs
about the productivity of investment. I find that false reports can increase welfare in the low
productivity state. Following a false report, entrepreneurs overestimate the productivity of
new venture and have more aggressive investment strategies. Since there is complementarity,
entrepreneurs benefit from a higher level of aggregate investment. When agents distrust
the government, the bias in the entrepreneurs’ beliefs is small and welfare improving: the
potential losses caused by overestimation of productivity are offset by the complementarity
gains. As the trust in the false reports increases, there is too much investment and welfare
starts to decrease. In the high productivity state however, welfare is increasing in the
entrepreneurs’ trust in the government. When the entrepreneurs do not trust a true report
of a high productivity state, they underestimate the productivity of a new venture, there is
less investment, and welfare is reduced.
There are two interesting extensions to the model: including a concern for welfare in the
government’s utility function; and introducing the concern for future reputation and the
possibility of replacement. When welfare is taken into account, the efficient government
might depart from a truthful policy to increase welfare in the low productivity state. If the
government cares about the discounted value of being in office, it is possible to explore the
tradeoff between current and future reputation. With the introduction of replacement, this
framework can be used to analyze policy experiments concerning the frequency of elections.
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For example, if the government wants to maximize its reputation every T periods, when
elections are held, we can see how the choice of T affects welfare. We can also analyze how
the strength of the government (or institutions) affects the incentives to disclose information.
Suppose that whenever the reputation falls below a threshold µ, the incumbent is replaced,
and the stronger the government, the lower is µ. In this case, weaker governments will place
a higher weight on short-term reputation. This is equivalent to introducing the possibility
of recall at every period.
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APPENDIX
A.1. A numerical example
This section provides a numerical example for the baseline model with commitment. The
state of fundamentals is uniformly distributed in [0, 1]:
θ ∼ U(0, 1).
The exchange rate in the absence of government intervention is
f(θ) = θ.
If the government maintains the peg, the exchange rate is
e∗ = 1.
The cost of short selling is
t = 0.25.
The government’s value of defending the currency is
v = 0.75.
The cost of defending the currency is
c(α, θ) = 1− θ + α,
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where α is the measure of speculators that attack the currency. 1
For a given θ, the government decides to abandon the peg if the fraction α of speculators
attacking the currency is at least a(θ), where
a(θ) =
 0, if θ ∈ [0, 0.25]θ − 0.25, if θ ∈ (0.25, 1] .
Define θ as the solution to c(0, θ) = v, and define θ as the solution to e∗ − f(θ) = t. We
have
θ = 0.25, θ = 0.75.
Speculators receive a signal x = θ + ε˜, where
ε˜ ∼ U(−ε, ε).
The precision of the signal is affected by the parameter ε:
ε = 0.1.
If a speculator receives the signal x ∈ [−ε, 1 + ε], he will believe that θ is uniformly dis-
tributed in [x− ε, x+ ε] ∩ [0, 1].
Let ψ(k) solve
1
2
− ψ(k)
2ε
= k + ψ(k)− 0.25
1Note that c(0, 0) = 1 > v and c(1, 1) = 1 > v, but c(0.1, 0.8) = 1 + 0.1 − 0.8 = 0.3 < v, so there are
regions where the government decides to maintain the peg.
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or
ψ(k)
(
1 +
1
2ε
)
=
3
4
− k
ψ(k) =
(
3
4
− k
)(
1 +
1
.2
)−1
=
(
3
4
− k
)
(6)−1 =
1
8
− k
6
.
The speculators payoff from following Ik when there is no public signal is given by
2
u(k, Ik) =
1
2ε
∫ k+ψ(k)
k−ε
e∗ − f(θ)dθ − t = 5
∫ k+ψ(k)
k−ε
1− θdθ − 0.25.
= 5
[
θ − θ
2
2
]∣∣∣∣k+ψ(k)
k−ε
− 0.25
=0.764k2 − 1.854k + 0.861.
Proceeding numerically,
u(x∗, Ix∗) = 0 ⇐⇒ x∗=˜0.626,
which implies
θ∗=˜0.64.
A speculator will attack the currency x < x∗, and will not attack if x > x∗. Given this rule,
the government will abandon the peg when θ < θ∗, and maintain the peg if θ > θ∗.
For a given θ, the fraction of speculators attacking the currency is
P(θ + ε˜ < x∗) = P(ε˜ < x∗ − θ) =

0, if θ ≥ x∗ + ε
ε+x∗−θ
2ε , if θ ∈ (x∗ − ε, x∗ + ε)
1, if θ ≤ x∗ − ε
2For k ∈ (0.1, 0.9).
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The expected payoff to the government is
P(θ < θ∗) · 0 + P(θ > θ∗)
∫ 1
θ∗
v − (1− θ + α(θ)) dθ.
A.1.1. Public signal
Suppose that the government can commit to a public signal. The government chooses
m ∈ [0, 1] and emits a signal
y(θ) =
 yl, if θ ≤ myh, if θ > m .
Given the parameters above, m = x∗ − ε = 0.526. Figure 1 depicts the mass of speculators
who attack the currency for different choices of m, compared to the case where there is
no public signal. It also shows the critical mass of attackers needed for the government to
abandon the peg, a(θ).
Suppose that, in the case of multiplicity given a choice of m, the government only cares
about the lowest equilibrium payoff. In this case, the government chooses a partition P
to maximize V (P ). From Theorem 3, the government wants to set m as close as possible
to m. Since m = x∗ − ε, from Theorem 2, for m = m, there exists an equilibrium where
speculators follow Ix∗ when y = yh. Hence, the choice m = m leads to multiple equilibria,
and it is dominated by any m ∈ (m, θ∗], which lead to a unique equilibrium. Theorem 3
thus implies that there is no equilibrium for this game. However, the government can still
achieve a payoff arbitrarily close to V¯ = supP V (P ) = limm↓m V (Pm). Figure 2 depicts the
government’s payoff V (Pm) for all possible choices of m ∈ [0, 1].
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Figure 1: Mass of speculators attacking the currency for different choices of m, compared
to the case with no public signal.
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Figure 2: Government’s payoff V (Pm) given the choice of m.
A.2. Proofs for Chapter 1
A.2.1. Posteriors
For any pair of continuous random variables A and B, let gAB denote their joint pdf. Let
gA and gB denote the marginal pdfs, and let gA|B denote the pdf of A conditional on B.
Finally, denote the cdfs by GA and GB. Following the main text, we denote the pdf of the
idiosyncratic noise by g, and its cdf by G, ommiting the subscripts.
No public signal
For x ∈ (−ε, 1 + ε):
gθ|x(θ|x) =
gθx(θ, x)
gx(x)
=
1
σg(
x−θ
σ )gθ(θ)∫ +∞
−∞
1
σg(
x−θ˜
σ )gθ(θ˜)dθ˜
=
1
σg
(
x−θ
σ
)
G
(
x
σ
)−G (x−1σ ) , if θ is uniform on [0, 1].
For x ∈ {−ε, 1 + ε}: P(θ = 0|x = −ε) = 1; P(θ = 1|x = 1 + ε) = 1.
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Public signal
Posterior of θ ∈ yn conditional on the public signal y = yn:
gθ(θ|yn) = gθ(θ)
P (mn−1 ≤ θ ≤ mn) =
gθ(θ)
Gθ(mn)−Gθ(mn−1) .
Distribution of xi conditional on y = yn:
P (xi ≤ x|yn) =
∫ x
−∞
∫mn
mn−1 gθx(θ, x˜)dθdx˜
Gθ(mn)−Gθ(mn−1) =
∫ x
−∞
∫mn
mn−1
1
σg(
x˜−θ
σ )gθ(θ)dθdx˜
Gθ(mn)−Gθ(mn−1)
⇒ gx(x|yn) =
∫mn
mn−1
1
σg(
x−θ
σ )gθ(θ)dθ
Gθ(mn)−Gθ(mn−1) .
Hence, the posterior of θ conditional on (x, yn) is
gθ|x(θ|x; yn) =
gθx(θ, x|yn)
gx(x|yn) =
gx|θ(x|θ; yn)gθ(θ|yn)
gx(x|yn)
=
1
σg(
x−θ
σ )[gθ(θ)/(Gθ(mn)−Gθ(mn−1))][∫m1
mn−1
1
σg(
x−θ˜
σ )gθ(θ˜)dθ˜/(Gθ(mn)−Gθ(mn−1))
]
=
1
σg(
x−θ
σ )gθ(θ)∫mn
mn−1
1
σg(
x−θ˜
σ )gθ(θ˜)dθ˜
=
1
σg(
x−θ
σ )
G
(
x−mn−1
σ
)
−G (x−mnσ ) , if θ is uniform on [0, 1].
Comparison
In the case of a two-element partition, when y = yl (θ ≤ m):
gθ|x(θ|x; yl) = gθ|x(θ|x)γyl(x),
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where γyl(x) = [
∫ +∞
−∞
1
σg(
x−θ˜
σ )gθ(θ˜)dθ˜/
∫m
−∞
1
σg(
x−θ˜
σ )gθ(θ˜)dθ˜] ≥ 1. And if y = yh (θ > m):
gθ|x(θ|x; yh) = gθ|x(θ|x)γyh(x),
where γyh(x) = [
∫ +∞
−∞
1
σg(
x−θ˜
σ )gθ(θ˜)dθ˜/
∫ +∞
m
1
σg(
x−θ˜
σ )gθ(θ˜)dθ˜] ≥ 1.
A.2.2. Proof of Lemma 1
Lemma 1. For a given public signal y, if pi(x, y) ≥ pi′(x, y) for all x, then uy(x, pi) ≥
uy(x, pi
′) for all x.
Proof:
pi(x, y) ≥ pi′(y, x)∀x⇒ s(θ, pi) ≥ s(θ, pi′)⇒ A(pi) ∩ y ⊇ A(pi′) ∩ y ⇒ uy(x, pi) ≥ uy(x, pi′).

A.2.3. Derivation of ψ
For k ∈ [−ε, 1 + ε], define θk as
θk = sup{θ : s(θ, Ik) ≥ a(θ)}.
θk is the largest value of θ such that the government finds it optimal to abandon the peg
when speculators’ aggregate short sales are given by Ik. Since s(·, Ik) is decreasing and a(·)
is increasing, the government abandons the peg if and only if θ ≤ θk.
If k ≤ θ − ε,
s(k + ε, Ik) = G
(−ε
σ
)
= 0,
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which implies that θk = θ. If k ∈ (θ − ε, 1 + ε],
s(k − ε, Ik) = G
( ε
σ
)
= 1 > a(k − ε),
therefore θk is well-defined.
3 Note that θk is continuous in k.
Define k¯ as the unique value of k that solves
G
(
k − 1
σ
)
= a(1).
Hence k¯ = 1 + σG−1(a(1)). Since a(1) ∈ (0, 1), k¯ ∈ (1− ε, 1 + ε).
For k ∈ (θ − ε, k¯], θk is then the unique value of θ that solves
G
(
k − θ
σ
)
= a(θ). (A.1)
If θ < θ, the LHS of (A.1) is strictly positive, while the RHS equals 0, thus θk > θ. Note that
the LHS of (A.1) is strictly decreasing in θ, for θ ∈ (k − ε, k + ε), and constant otherwise.
For θ > θ, a(θ) ∈ (0, 1), and it is strictly increasing. This implies that θk ∈ (k − ε, k + ε),
and that θk is strictly increasing in k. Finally, if k > k¯, θk = 1.
Define the function ψ as ψ(k) = min{θk − k, ε}, for k ∈ [−ε, 1 + ε]. Thus
ψ(k) =

ε, if k ≤ θ − ε
−σG−1(a(θk)) ∈ (−ε, ε), if k ∈ (θ − ε, k¯]
1− k ∈ [−ε, ε), if k > k¯
.
From the continuity of θk, it follows that ψ(k) is continuous. Since θk is strictly increasing
for k ∈ (θ − ε, k¯], then ψ(k) is strictly decreasing for k > θ − ε.
3c(1, 1) > v implies that a(1) < 1, thus a(θ) < 1 for all θ.
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A.2.4. Proof of Lemma 2
Lemma 2. For a given public signal y, uy(k, Ik) is continuous in k, for all possible private
signals k ∈ Xy.
Proof: Using 1.11, the payoff function when y = yn is given by
uyn(k, Ik) =
∫ byn
ayn
[e∗ − f(θ)]φyn(θ|k)dθ − t, (A.2)
where ayn = max{k − ε,mn−1}, and byn = max{min{k + ψ(k),mn},mn−1}. Since φyn(·|k)
and the limits of integration are continuous in k (because ψ(·) is continuous), uyn(k, Ik) is
continuous in k. 
A.2.5. Proof of Lemma 3
Lemma 3. For k ∈ (ε, 1− ε), the payoff function u(k, Ik) is strictly decreasing in k.
Proof: For k ∈ (ε, 1− ε)
u(k, Ik) =
∫ k+ψ(k)
k−ε
[e∗ − f(θ)]
1
σg
(
k−θ
σ
)
G
(
k
σ
)−G (k−1σ )dθ − t.
Differentiating u(k, Ik) with respect to k and using the fact that G
(
k−1
σ
)
= g
(
k−1
σ
)
= 0,
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for k < 1− ε, yield
d
dk
u(k, Ik)
= [e∗ − f(k + ψ(k))](1 + ψ′(k))
1
σg
(−ψ(k)
σ
)
G
(
k
σ
) − [e∗ − f(k − ε)] 1σg ( εσ)
G
(
k
σ
)
+
∫ k+ψ(k)
k−ε
[e∗ − f(θ)]
1
σ2
g′
(
k−θ
σ
)
G
(
k
σ
) dθ − ∫ k+ψ(k)
k−ε
[e∗ − f(θ)] 1
σ2
g
(
k−θ
σ
)
g
(
k
σ
)
G
(
k
σ
)2 dθ
≤ [e∗ − f(k + ψ(k))]
1
σg
(−ψ(k)
σ
)
G
(
k
σ
) − [e∗ − f(k − ε)] 1σg ( εσ)
G
(
k
σ
)
+
∫ k+ψ(k)
k−ε
[e∗ − f(θ)]
1
σ2
g′
(
k−θ
σ
)
G
(
k
σ
) dθ,
where the inequality comes from ψ′(k) ≤ 0, and from the fact that the last term on the
RHS of the equality is positive. Define ε˜ as
ε˜ = inf
{
ε˜ ∈
[−ψ(k)
σ
,
ε
σ
]
: g′(εˆ) ≤ 0 ∀εˆ > ε˜
}
.
From (1.1), ε˜ is well defined. Furthermore, g′(ε˜) ≥ 0, for ε˜ ≤ ε˜, and g′(ε˜) ≤ 0, for ε˜ > ε˜.
Define θ˜ as
θ˜ = k − σε˜.
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Hence θ˜ ∈ [k − ε, k + ψ(k)]. We then have
G
(
k
σ
)[
d
dk
u(k, Ik)
]
≤ [e∗ − f(k + ψ(k))] 1
σ
g
(−ψ(k)
σ
)
− [e∗ − f(k − ε)] 1
σ
g
( ε
σ
)
+
∫ min{θ˜,k+ψ(k)}
k−ε
[e∗ − f(θ)] 1
σ2
g′
(
k − θ
σ
)
dθ
+
∫ k+ψ(k)
min{θ˜,k+ψ(k)}
[e∗ − f(θ)] 1
σ2
g′
(
k − θ
σ
)
dθ
≤ [e∗ − f(k + ψ(k))] 1
σ
g
(−ψ(k)
σ
)
− [e∗ − f(k − ε)] 1
σ
g
( ε
σ
)
+ [e∗ − f(min{θ˜, k + ψ(k)})]
∫ min{θ˜,k+ψ(k)}
k−ε
1
σ2
g′
(
k − θ
σ
)
dθ
+ [e∗ − f(min{θ˜, k + ψ(k)})]
∫ k+ψ(k)
min{θ˜,k+ψ(k)}
1
σ2
g′
(
k − θ
σ
)
dθ
= [e∗ − f(k + ψ(k))] 1
σ
g
(−ψ(k)
σ
)
− [e∗ − f(k − ε)] 1
σ
g
( ε
σ
)
+ [e∗ − f(min{θ˜, k + ψ(k)})]
[
1
σ
g
( ε
σ
)
− 1
σ
g
(
k −min{θ˜, k + ψ(k)}
σ
)]
+ [e∗ − f(min{θ˜, k + ψ(k)})]
[
1
σ
g
(
k −min{θ˜, k + ψ(k)}
σ
)
− 1
σ
g
(−ψ(k)
σ
)]
=
1
σ
{
g
(−ψ(k)
σ
)[
f(min{θ˜, k + ψ(k)})− f(k + ψ(k))})
]
+g
( ε
σ
) [
f(k − ε)− f(min{θ˜, k + ψ(k)})
]}
,
< 0,
which implies that u(k, Ik) is strictly increasing in k. 
A.2.6. Proof that Assumption 1 holds for concave or normal distributions
Here we show two assumptions on the distribution of the idiosyncratic noise that guarantee
that Assumption 1 is satisfied. The first assumption is that the probability density function
g is concave on [−ε¯, ε¯]. The second assumption is that the noise follows a truncated normal
distribution on [−ε¯, ε¯].
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Without loss of generality, assume that σ = 1. In this case, ε = ε¯. Let the public signal be
y and consider two private signals x1 and x2, with x1 < x2. There are five possible cases:
1. θ ≤ x1 − ε: Φy(θ|x1) = Φy(θ|x2) = 0;
2. θ ≥ x2 + ε: Φy(θ|x1) = Φy(θ|x2) = 1;
3. θ ∈ (x1 − ε, x2 − ε): Φy(θ|x1) > Φy(θ|x2) = 0;
4. θ ∈ (x1 + ε, x2 + ε): 1 = Φy(θ|x1) > Φy(θ|x2);
5. θ ∈ [x2 − ε, x1 + ε].
To prove that Assumption 1 is satisfied, it is left to show that Φy(θ|x2) ≤ Φy(θ|x1) for all
θ ∈ [x2 − ε, x1 + ε]. Note that, in this case, x2 < x1 + 2ε.
Concave distribution
Let the probability density function of the idiosyncratic noise, g, be concave on [−ε, ε]. The
density of θ conditional on a public signal y = yn and a private signal x is given by
φy(θ|x) = g(x− θ)
G(x−mn−1)−G(x−mn) .
Consider two private signals x1 and x2, with x1 < x2 and x2 < x1 + 2ε, and define δ =
x2 − x1 < 2ε. For θ ∈ [x2 − ε, x1 + ε]
φy(θ|x1)
φy(θ|x2) =
g(x1 − θ)
g(x1 − θ + δ) c¯,
where c¯ = [G(x2 −mn−1)−G(x2 −mn)]/[G(x1 −mn−1)−G(x1 −mn)].
To prove that Assumption 1 holds for θ ∈ [x2 − ε, x1 + ε], two results are needed.
Claim 1. If g is concave on [−ε, ε], then φy(·|x1) crosses φy(·|x1) at most once for θ ∈
[x2 − ε, x1 + ε].
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Proof: Suppose that there exists θ1 and θ2 in [x2 − ε, x1 + ε], with θ1 < θ2, such that
φy(θ1|x1)
φyn(θ1|x2)
=
φy(θ2|x1)
φy(θ2|x2) = 1.
Define εH = x1 − θ1 and εL = x1 − θ2. Hence
c¯g(εH) = g(εH + δ),
c¯g(εL) = g(εL + δ).
There are three cases:
1. c¯ > 1:
g(εH) < g(εH + δ),
g(εL) < g(εL + δ).
It must be true that g(εH) > g(εL), otherwise g would decrease or be constant some-
where between εL and εH , and then increase somewhere between εH and εH + δ, a
contradiction with the concavity of g. The slope of the line segment that connects
points (εL, g(εL)) and (εL + δ, g(εL + δ)) is given by
SL = (c¯− 1)g(εL)
δ
,
and the slope of the line segment that connects (εH , g(εH)) and (εH + δ, g(εH + δ)) is
given by
SH = (c¯− 1)g(εH)
δ
.
Since g(εH) > g(εL), it follows that SH > SL, a contradiction with the concavity of
g.
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2. c¯ < 1:
g(εH) > g(εH + δ),
g(εL) > g(εL + δ).
It must be true that g(εL) > g(εH), otherwise g(εL) ≤ g(εH) and g(εL+δ) = c¯g(εL) ≤
c¯g(εH) = g(εH + δ). In this case, g would decrease between εL and εL + δ, and then
increase or be constant somewhere between εL + δ and εH + δ, a contradiction with
the concavity of g. The slope of the line segment that connects points (εL, g(εL)) and
(εL + δ, g(εL + δ)) is given by
SL = (c¯− 1)g(εL)
δ
,
and the slope of the line segment that connects (εH , g(εH)) and (εH + δ, g(εH + δ)) is
given by
SH = (c¯− 1)g(εH)
δ
.
Since g(εL) > g(εH) and c¯ < 1, it follows that SH > SL, a contradiction with the
concavity of g.
3. c = 1:
g(εH) = g(εH + δ),
g(εL) = g(εL + δ),
thus it must be the case that g(εH) = g(εL) and g is flat between εL and εH + δ.

Claim 2. If g is concave on [−ε, ε], then φy(·|x2) can only cross φy(·|x1) from below for
θ ∈ [x2 − ε, x1 + ε].
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Proof: Suppose that φy(θ|x2) crosses φy(θ|x1) from above in [x2 − ε, x1 + ε]. Then, there
exist θ1 and θ2 in [x2 − ε, x1 + ε], with θ1 < θ2, such that:
φy(θ1|x2) = φy(θ1|x1),
φy(θ2|x2) < φy(θ2|x1).
Define εH = x1 − θ1 and εL = x1 − θ2. The inequalities above imply
c¯g(εH) = g(εH + δ),
c¯g(εL) > g(εL + δ).
Denote the slope of the line segment that connects points (εI , g(εI)) and (εI + δ, g(εI + δ))
by SI , for I ∈ {L,H}. There are three cases:
1. c¯ = 1: then SL < 0 and SH , 0, a contradiction with the concavity of g.
2. c¯ > 1: then g(εH) < g(εH + δ). It follows that g(εL) ≤ g(εH), otherwise g would
decrease between εL and εH , and then increase between εH and εH+δ, a contradiction
with the concavity of g. Thus
SL < (c¯− 1)g(εL)
δ
≤ (c¯− 1)g(εH)
δ
= SH ,
a contradiction with the concavity of g.
3. c¯ < 1: then g(εL) > g(εL + δ). It follows that g(εL) > g(εH), otherwise
g(εH + δ) = c¯g(εH) ≥ c¯g(εL) > g(εL + δ),
therefore g would decrease between εL and εL + δ, and then increase between εL + δ
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and εH + δ, a contradiction with the concavity of g. Thus
SL < −(1− c¯)g(εL)
δ
≤ −(1− c¯)g(εH)
δ
= SH ,
a contradiction with the concavity of g.

Claims 1 and 2 imply that, if there exists θ ∈ [x2−ε, x1 +ε], such that φy(θ|x2) > φy(θ|x1),
then φy(θ˜|x2) ≥ φy(θ˜|x1) for all θ˜ > θ. This implies that, if there exists θ ∈ [x2 − ε, x1 + ε],
such that Φy(θ|x2) > Φy(θ|x1), then Φy(θ˜|x2) > Φy(θ˜|x1), for all θ˜ > θ. In particular,
Φy(x1 + ε|x2) > Φy(x1 + ε|x1) = 1, a contradiction. Thus Φy(θ|x2) ≤ Φy(θ|x1), for all
θ ∈ [x2 − ε, x1 + ε], and Assumption 1 holds.
Normal distribution
Suppose that the idiosyncratic noise follows a truncated normal distribution on [−ε, ε], with
the originating distribution having mean µ and variance ν2. Let the public signal be y and
consider two private signals x1 and x2, with x1 < x2 and x2 < x1 + 2ε. To prove that
Φy(θ|x2) ≤ Φy(θ|x1) for θ ∈ [x2 − ε, x1 + ε], it suffices to show that the following monotone
likelihood ratio holds
φy(θ2|x2)
φy(θ1|x2) ≥
φy(θ2|x1)
φy(θ1|x1) , ∀θ1 < θ2.
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Let θ1, θ2 ∈ [x2 − ε, x1 + ε]. Then
φy(θ2|x2)
φy(θ1|x2) ≥
φy(θ2|x1)
φy(θ1|x1)
⇔
exp
(
− (x2−θ2−µ)2
2ν2
)
exp
(−(x2−θ1−µ)2
2ν2
) ≥ exp
(
− (x1−θ2−µ)2
2ν2
)
exp
(
− (x1−θ1−µ)2
2ν2
)
⇔ exp
(−(x2 − θ2 − µ)2 + (x2 − θ1 − µ)2
2ν2
)
≥ exp
(−(x1 − θ2 − µ)2 + (x1 − θ1 − µ)2
2ν2
)
⇔ −(x2 − θ2 − µ)2 + (x2 − θ1 − µ)2 ≥ −(x1 − θ2 − µ)2 + (x1 − θ1 − µ)2
⇔ −(x2 − θ2)2 + 2µ(θ1 − θ2) + (x2 − θ1)2 ≥ −(x1 − θ2)2 + 2µ(θ1 − θ2) + (x1 − θ1)2
⇔ −x22 + 2x2θ2 − θ22 + x22 − 2x2θ1 + θ21 ≥ −x21 + 2x1θ2 − θ22 + x21 − 2x1θ1 + θ21
⇔ 2x2(θ2 − θ1) ≥ 2x1(θ2 − θ1)
⇔ θ1 ≤ θ2,
which completes the proof.
A.2.7. Lemma 9
Lemma 15 Suppose that y = yn and that speculators follow Ik, for k ∈ Xyn. When
a speculator receives the private signal x = k, the payoff from attacking, uyn(k, Ik), is
continuous in both mn−1 and mn. The payoff uyn(k, Ik) is decreasing in mn−1 for k <
mn−1 + ε, and constant otherwise. It is also decreasing in mn for k > mn− ε, and constant
otherwise.
Proof: Without loss in generality, let y = y2. Then,
uy2(k, Ik) =
∫ max{min{k+ψ(k),m2},m1}
max{k−ε,m1}
[e∗ − f(θ)]
1
σg
(
k−θ
σ
)
D(k,m1,m2)
dθ − t,
where
D(k,m1,m2) = G
(
k −m1
σ
)
−G
(
k −m2
σ
)
.
The limits of integration are continuous in mn−1 and mn, and, since G is a continuous
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function, D is continuous in all of its arguments. Hence uy2(k, Ik) is continuous in mn−1
and mn.
If m1 − ψ(k) ≥ k, then uy2(k, Ik) = −t, which is constant in m1. If k > m1 + ε then the
limits of integration above are constant in m1 and so is D(k,m1,m2),
4 therefore uy2(k, Ik)
is constant in m1. Now consider the case m1 − ψ(k) < k ≤ m1 + ε:
uy2(k, Ik) =
∫ min{k+ψ(k),m2}
m1
[e∗ − f(θ)]
1
σg
(
k−θ
σ
)
D(k,m1,m2)
dθ − t,
then
∂
∂m1
uy2(k, Ik) = − [e∗ − f(m1)]
1
σg
(
k−m1
σ
)
D(k,m1,m2)
+
 1σg
(
k−m1
σ
)
D(k,m1,m2)
∫ min{k+ψ(k),m2}
m1
[e∗ − f(θ)]
1
σg
(
k−θ
σ
)
D(k,m1,m2)
dθ
< − [e∗ − f(m1)]
1
σg
(
k−m1
σ
)
D(k,m1,m2)
[
1−
∫ min{k+ψ(k),m2}
m1
1
σg
(
k−θ
σ
)
D(k,m1,m2)
dθ
]
= − [e∗ − f(m1)]
1
σg
(
k−m1
σ
)
D(k,m1,m2)
1− G
(
k−m1
σ
)
−G
(
k−min{k+ψ(k),m2}
σ
)
D(k,m1,m2)

≤ 0,
which completes the proof for m1.
Let k ≤ m2 − ε. Then
uy2(k, Ik) =
∫ max{k+ψ(k),m1}
max{k−ε,m1}
[e∗ − f(θ)]
1
σg
(
k−θ
σ
)
D(k,m1,m2)
dθ − t,
Since the limits of integration above are constant in m2, and so is D(k,m1,m2),
5 then
uy2(k, Ik) is constant in m2. The same is true for k ≤ m2 − ψ(k).
4For all m1 such that m1 < k − ε: k−m1σ > ε¯⇒ G( k−m1σ ) = 1
5For all m2 such that m2 ≥ k + ε: k−m2σ ≤ −ε¯⇒ G( k−m2σ ) = 0
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Now suppose m2 < k + ψ(k). The payoff becomes
uy2(k, Ik) =
∫ m2
max{k−ε,m1}
[e∗ − f(θ)]
1
σg
(
k−θ
σ
)
D(k,m1,m2)
dθ − t,
then
∂
∂m2
uy2(k, Ik) = [e
∗ − f(m2)]
1
σg
(
k−m2
σ
)
D(k,m1,m2)
−
 1σg
(
k−m2
σ
)
D(k,m1,m2)
∫ m2
max{m1,k−ε}
[e∗ − f(θ)]
1
σg
(
k−θ
σ
)
D(k,m1,m2)
dθ
< [e∗ − f(m2)]
1
σg
(
k−m2
σ
)
D(k,m1,m2)
[
1−
∫ m2
max{m1,k−ε}
1
σg
(
k−θ
σ
)
D(k,m1,m2)
dθ
]
= [e∗ − f(m2)]
1
σg
(
k−m2
σ
)
D(k,m1,m2)
1− G
(
k−max{m1,k−ε}
σ
)
−G
(
k−m2
σ
)
D(k,m1,m2)

= 0.
The last inequality comes from the fact that
G
(
k −max{m1, k − ε}
σ
)
= min
{
G
(
k −m1
σ
)
, G
( ε
σ
)}
= min
{
G
(
k −m1
σ
)
, 1
}
= G
(
k −m1
σ
)
⇒ G
(
k −max{m1, k − ε}
σ
)
−G
(
k − 2
σ
)
= D(k,m1,m2).

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A.2.8. Proof of Theorem 2
First, we need to compare uy(k, Ik) and u(k, Ik). Note that for k ≤ m− ε, from (1.12) and
(A.2), the limits of integration are6
ayl = a , byl = b,
and the density functions are the same, which implies that uyl(k, Ik) equals the payoff
function u(k, Ik). For k > m+ ε, from (1.12) and (A.2),
ayh = a , byh = b,
and the density functions are the same, which implies that uyh(k, Ik) equals the payoff
function u(k, Ik). From Lemma 2, the continuity of uyh(k, Ik) in k implies that uyh(k, Ik) =
u(k, Ik) for k = m+ε. The comparison between uy(k, Ik) and u(k, Ik) when k ∈ (m−ε,m+ε)
is analyzed in the two following lemmas.
Lemma 16 If the public signal is y = yl, then uyl(k, Ik) > u(k, Ik) for all k ∈ (m−ε,m+ε).
Proof:
uyl(k, Ik)− u(k, Ik)
=
∫ min{k+ψ(k),m}
max{k−ε,0}
[e∗ − f(θ)]φyl(θ|k)dθ −
∫ k+ψ(k)
max{k−ε,0}
[e∗ − f(θ)]
1
σg
(
k−θ
σ
)
G
(
k
σ
)−G (k−1σ )dθ
=
(
1
G
(
k
σ
)−G (k−mσ ) − 1G ( kσ)−G (k−1σ )
)∫ min{k+ψ(k),m}
max{k−ε,0}
[e∗ − f(θ)] 1
σ
g
(
k − θ
σ
)
dθ
−
∫ k+ψ(k)
min{k+ψ(k),m}
[e∗ − f(θ)]
1
σg
(
k−θ
σ
)
G
(
k
σ
)−G (k−1σ )dθ
6Here yl = y1, yh = y2, and m = m1.
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If k+ψ(k) ≤ m, the last integral equals zero, therefore uyl(k, Ik) > u(k, Ik). For k+ψ(k) >
m,
[uyl(k, Ik)− u(k, Ik)]
[
G
(
k
σ
)
−G
(
k − 1
σ
)]
=
(
G
(
k−m
σ
)−G (k−1σ )
G
(
k
σ
)−G (k−mσ )
)∫ m
max{k−ε,0}
[e∗ − f(θ)] 1
σ
g
(
k − θ
σ
)
dθ
−
∫ k+ψ(k)
m
[e∗ − f(θ)] 1
σ
g
(
k − θ
σ
)
dθ
>[e∗ − f(m)]
[(
G
(
k−m
σ
)−G (k−1σ )
G
(
k
σ
)−G (k−mσ )
)∫ m
max{k−ε,0}
1
σ
g
(
k − θ
σ
)
dθ
−
∫ k+ψ(k)
m
1
σ
g
(
k − θ
σ
)
dθ
]
=[e∗ − f(m)]
{(
G
(
k−m
σ
)−G (k−1σ )
G
(
k
σ
)−G (k−mσ )
)[
G
(
k −max{k − ε, 0}
σ
)
−G
(
k −m
σ
)]
−
[
G
(
k −m
σ
)
−G
(−ψ(k)
σ
)]}
=[e∗ − f(m)]
{(
G
(
k−m
σ
)−G (k−1σ )
G
(
k
σ
)−G (k−mσ )
)[
G
(
k
σ
)
−G
(
k −m
σ
)]
−
[
G
(
k −m
σ
)
−G
(−ψ(k)
σ
)]}
=[e∗ − f(m)]
[
G
(−ψ(k)
σ
)
−G
(
k − 1
σ
)]
≥0,
where the last inequality comes from k + ψ(k) ≤ 1. This implies that uyl(k, Ik) > u(k, Ik),
which completes the proof. 
Lemma 17 If the public signal is y = yh, then uyh(k, Ik) < u(k, Ik) for all k ∈ (m− ε,m+
ε).
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Proof: First note that if k + ψ(k) ≤ m, uyh(k, Ik) = −t < u(k, Ik). If k + ψ(k) > m,
[u(k, Ik)− uyh(k, Ik)]
[
G
(
k
σ
)
−G
(
k − 1
σ
)]
=
∫ k+ψ(k)
max{k−ε,0}
[e∗ − f(θ)] 1
σ
g
(
k − θ
σ
)
dθ
−
[
G
(
k
σ
)
−G
(
k − 1
σ
)]∫ k+ψ(k)
m
[e∗ − f(θ)]φyh(θ|k)dθ
=
∫ m
max{k−ε,0}
[e∗ − f(θ)] 1
σ
g
(
k − θ
σ
)
dθ
−
(
G
(
k
σ
)−G (k−mσ )
G
(
k−m
σ
)−G (k−1σ )
)∫ k+ψ(k)
m
[e∗ − f(θ)] 1
σ
g
(
k − θ
σ
)
dθ
<[e∗ − f(m)]
[∫ m
max{k−ε,0}
1
σ
g
(
k − θ
σ
)
dθ
−
(
G
(
k
σ
)−G (k−mσ )
G
(
k−m
σ
)−G (k−1σ )
)∫ k+ψ(k)
m
1
σ
g
(
k − θ
σ
)
dθ
]
=[e∗ − f(m)]
{
G
(
k −max{k − ε, 0}
σ
)
−G
(
k −m
σ
)
−
(
G
(
k
σ
)−G (k−mσ )
G
(
k−m
σ
)−G (k−1σ )
)[
G
(
k −m
σ
)
−G
(−ψ(k)
σ
)]}
≤[e∗ − f(m)]
[
G
(
k −max{k − ε, 0}
σ
)
−G
(
k
σ
)]
=0,
which implies that u(k, Ik) < uyh(k, Ik), therefore the proof is complete. 
Now we can prove Theorem 2:
Theorem 2. Fix m. If m = θ∗, there is a unique equilibrium, in which speculators follow
the public signal. If m 6= θ∗, the equilibrium may not be unique. There are bounds x∗ ≥ x∗
and x¯∗ ≤ x∗ such that, in any equilibrium, pi(x, yl) ≥ Ix∗(x) and pi(x, yh) ≤ Ix¯∗(x) for all
x. The equilibria are as follows:
i. if m < θ∗: speculators always attack the currency and the peg is abandoned if y = yl;
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moreover, if m ∈ (x∗ − ε, θ∗), then x¯∗ < x∗;
ii. if m > θ∗: the currency is not attacked and the peg defended if y = yh; moreover, if
m ∈ (θ∗, x∗ + ε), then x∗ > x∗.
Proof: Now consider any possible strategy profile for the speculators. For y ∈ {yl, yh}, let
pi(x, y) denote the proportion of speculators who attack the currency given a private signal
x. Define xy and x¯y as
xy = inf{x ∈ Xy : pi(x, y) < 1}, and x¯y = sup{x ∈ Xy : pi(x, y) > 0}.
Note that xy ≤ x¯y. If xy ∈ Xy, then from Lemma 1
uy(xy, Ixy) ≤ uy(xy, pi) ≤ 0, (A.3)
and if x¯y ∈ Xy
uy(x¯y, Ix¯y) ≥ uy(x¯y, pi) ≥ 0. (A.4)
Using Lemma 3, the proof of existence and uniqueness of equilibrium in the game without
public signal is analogous to the one in Morris and Shin (1998). The speculators follow a
cutoff strategy Ix∗ , such that u(x
∗, Ix∗) = 0, with x∗ ∈ (ε, 1 − ε). Since u(k, Ik) > 0 for
k ≤ ε, and u(k, Ik) < 0 for k ≥ 1− ε, it follows from Lemma 3 that u(k, Ik) > 0 for k < x∗,
and that u(k, Ik) < 0 for k > x
∗.
First, let θ ∈ yl = [0,m]. From Lemma 16, uyl(k, Ik) ≥ u(k, Ik), with strict inequality for
k ∈ (m − ε,m + ε). If x∗ /∈ Xyl = [−ε,m + ε], then uyl(k, Ik) is strictly positive for all
k. From (A.3) all speculators attack the currency for θ ∈ yl, therefore the peg is always
abandoned. If x∗ ∈ Xyl , then
uyl(x
∗, Ix∗) ≥ u(x∗, Ix∗) = 0,
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with strict inequality for m ∈ (x∗− ε, x∗+ ε). Hence, either every speculator attacks for all
x ∈ Xyl , in which case θ∗ = m, or xyl ≥ x∗, with strict inequality if m ∈ (x∗− ε, x∗+ ε). In
the latter case, all speculators attack the curency for x < xyl . This guarantees the existence
of θ∗ ∈ [θ∗,m] such that the government always abandons the currency peg for all θ ≤ θ∗.7
Furthermore, if m ∈ (x∗ − ε, x∗ + ε) then θ∗ > θ∗.
Now let θ ∈ yh = (m, 1]. From Lemma 17, uyh(k, Ik) ≤ u(k, Ik), with strict inequality for
m ∈ (x∗ − ε, x∗ + ε). If x∗ /∈ Xyh = (m − ε, 1 + ε], then uyh(k, Ik) is strictly negative for
all k. From (A.4) the currency is not attacked for any θ ∈ yh, and the government finds it
optimal to keep the peg. If x∗ ∈ Xyh , then
uyh(x
∗, Ix∗) ≤ u(x∗, Ix∗) = 0,
with strict inequality for m ∈ (x∗− ε, x∗+ ε). Hence, either x¯yh ≤ x∗, with strict inequality
if m ∈ (x∗−ε, x∗+ε) , or the currency is never attacked, in which case θ¯∗ = m. In the former
case, no speculator attacks the curency for x > x¯yh , therefore there exists θ¯
∗ ∈ [m, θ∗] such
that the currency peg is never abandoned for θ > θ¯∗.8 Furthermore, if m ∈ (x∗ − ε, x∗ + ε)
then θ¯∗ < θ∗.
For m = θ∗, since θ∗ ∈ [θ∗,m] and θ¯∗ ∈ [m, θ∗], it must be the case that θ∗ = θ¯∗ = m. Thus
the unique equilibrium involves coordination on the public signal.
For m < θ∗, then the currency is always attacked on yl = [0,m] and θ∗ = m, otherwise
θ∗ ≤ θ∗ ≤ m, a contradiction. Since m < θ∗, then x∗ ∈ Xyh . Hence, if x∗ /∈ (m− ε,m+ ε),
then θ¯∗ ∈ [m, θ∗], and if x∗ ∈ (m− ε,m+ ε), then θ¯∗ ∈ [m, θ∗). In the latter case, x¯yh < x∗.
For m > θ∗, then the currency is never attacked on yh = (m, 1] and θ¯∗ = m, otherwise
m ≤ θ¯∗ ≤ θ∗, a contradiction. Since m > θ∗, then x∗ ∈ Xyl . Hence, if x∗ /∈ (m− ε,m+ ε),
7Take for example θ∗ = θxyl , the value of θ that makes the government indifferent when speculators
follow Ixyl
(s(θxyl
, Ixyl
) = a(θxyl
)).
8Take for example θ¯∗ = θx¯yh , the value of θ that makes the government indifferent when speculators
follow Ix¯yh (s(θx¯yh , Ix¯yh ) = a(θx¯yh )).
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then θ∗ ∈ [θ∗,m], and if x∗ ∈ (m− ε,m+ ε), then θ∗ ∈ (θ∗,m]. In the latter case, xyl > x∗.
A.2.9. Lemma 12
Lemma 18 Suppose that Assumption 1 is satisfied. Then, m < θ¯.
Proof: We need to find m < θ¯ such that u(m,1](k, Ik) < 0 for all k. Consider the partition
P θ¯ and let k¯ solve θk¯ = θ¯.
9
We claim that u(θ¯,1](k, Ik) ≤ δ < 0 for all k ∈ (θ¯ − ε, 1 + ε). To see this, let k ≤ k¯. If
speculators follow Ik, then the threshold for the government to abandon the peg is θk ≤ θ¯,
which means that the government does not abandon the peg on (θ¯, 1]. Hence u(θ¯,1](k, Ik) =
−t for any k ≤ k¯. For k > k¯
u(θ¯,1](k, Ik) ≤ u(θ¯,1](k, I1+ε) ≤ u(θ¯,1](k¯, I1+ε) ≡ δ < 0,
where the first inequality comes from Lemma 1, the second inequality comes from Lemma
4, and the last inequality comes from the fact that it is never profitable to attack when
y = (θ¯, 1]. Since δ ≥ −t, we have that u(θ¯,1](k, Ik) ≤ δ for all k.
Define l1m and l
2
m as
l1m = lim
k↓k¯
u(m,1](k, I1+ε),
and
l2m = lim
k↓θ¯−ε
u(m,1](k, Ik¯).
Since u(θ¯,1](k, I1+ε) ≤ δ for all k > k¯, continuity implies that l1θ¯ ≤ δ. Since u(θ¯,1](k, Ik¯) ≤ δ
for k ∈ (θ¯ − ε, k¯], continuity also implies that l2
θ¯
≤ δ. From Lemmas 1 and 4, l1m ≥
u(m,1](k, Ik) for k > k¯, and l
2
m ≥ u(m,1](k, Ik) for k ∈ (θ¯ − ε, k¯]. Then lm ≡ max{l1m, l2m} ≥
u(m,1](k, Ik) for k > θ¯ − ε. From Lemma 15, l1m and l2m are continuous in m, and so
is lm. Hence, there exists m
′ < θ¯ such that lm′ < lθ¯ − δ/2 ≤ δ/2 < 0. This implies that
9a(θ¯) = s(θ¯, Ik¯), that is, if speculators follow the cutoff rule Ik¯, the government is indifferent between
defending the currency and abandoning the peg at θ = θ¯.
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u(m′,1](k, Ik) ≤ δ/2 for k > θ¯−ε. In this case, either u(m′,1](k, Ik) < 0 for all k ∈ (m′−ε, θ¯−ε],
or there exists k′ = sup{k ∈ (m′ − ε, θ¯ − ε] : u(m′,1](k, Ik) ≥ 0}. From Lemma 6, either
there is no attack on (m′, 1], thus m′ ∈M , or, in the worst equilibrium for the government,
speculators follow Ik′ after observing (m
′, 1]. In the latter case, the government abandons the
peg for θ ≤ θk′ ∈ (m′, θ¯). Consider the partition P θk′ . From Lemma 15, u(θk′ ,1](k, Ik) < 0
for all k ∈ X(θk′ ,1], and, from Lemma 6, there is no attack on yh. This means that θk′ ∈M .
Thus, either θ¯ > m′ ∈M or θ¯ > θk′ ∈M , which implies that m < θ¯. 
A.2.10. Proof of Theorem 3
Theorem 3. Suppose that Assumption 1 is satisfied. For every partition P , V (P ) ≤ V ,
where
V = lim
m↓m
V (Pm) = sup
m∈M
V (Pm).
Then
i. if m ∈M , the government’s equilibrium payoff is V . In equilibrium, when θ > m, there
are no attacks and the peg is maintained; and when θ ≤ m, every speculator attacks the
currency and the peg is abandoned. The government can achieve the payoff V with the
two-interval partition Pm = {0,m, 1}.
ii. if m /∈ M , no equilibrium exists. However, the government can achieve a payoff arbi-
trarily close to V .
Proof: For any two partitions A and B, if V (A) > V (B), then A is said to be preferred to
B. From Lemma 18, we know that m < θ¯.
Suppose that the partition P is optimal. From Theorem 1, we can assume that P =
{0,m, 1}.
i. a. Suppose that m > m. In this case, there exists m′ ∈ [m,m) ∩M . If m ≤ θ∗, from
Theorem 2, it follows that the peg is abandoned if and only if θ ∈ [0,m]. Since
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m′ ∈ M and m′ < θ∗, the peg is abandoned if and only if θ ∈ [0,m′]. Hence the
partition {0,m′, 1} is preferred to P . If m > θ∗, from Theorem 2, partition {0, θ∗, 1}
is preferred to P , a contradiction with the optimality of P . Hence m ≤ m < θ¯.
b. Suppose that m < m. Since m < θ¯, the peg is abandoned for θ ∈ [0,m]. From
Lemma 7, in the worst equilibrium for the government, speculators follow a cutoff
rule Ikh after observing yh, where kh = sup{k ∈ Xyh : uyh(k, Ik) ≥ 0}. Given the
speculators’ strategy, there exists θkh > m such that the peg is abandoned if and
only if θ ≤ θkh . From Lemma 15, increasing m would (weakly) decrease the cutoff
signal k, which would (weakly) decrease the threshold state θk. This implies that,
with partition P ′ = {0, θkh , 1}, no one attacks if θ ∈ (θkh , 1]. Thus, P ′ is preferred
to P , a contradiction with the optimality of P . We have that m = m.
ii. From a., b., if P is an optimal partition, then m = m. If m ∈ M , partition Pm =
{0,m, 1} is optimal. If m /∈ M , there is no equilibrium, but the government can
achieve a payoff arbitrarily close to V = limm↓m V (Pm).

A.3. Proofs for Chapter 2
A.3.1. Posteriors
For any pair of continuous random variables A and B, let gAB denote their joint pdf. Let
gA and gB denote the marginal pdfs, and let gA|B denote the pdf of A conditional on B.
Finally, denote the cdfs by GA and GB. Following the main text, we denote the pdf of the
idiosyncratic noise by g, and its cdf by G, omitting the subscripts.
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For x ∈ (θmin − ε, θmax + ε):
gθ|x(θ|x) =
gθx(θ, x)
gx(x)
=
g(x− θ)gθ(θ)∫ +∞
−∞ g(x− θ˜)gθ(θ˜)dθ˜
=
g (x− θ)
G (x− θmin)−G (x− θmax) , if θ is uniform on [θmin, θmax].
For x ∈ {−ε, 1 + ε}: P(θ = 0|x = −ε) = 1; P(θ = 1|x = 1 + ε) = 1.
A.3.2. Equilibrium Policy
Before proving the results in Section 2.3, I first present some auxiliary results. For µt ∈
(0, 1):
Claim 1 Given Assumption 1, FH(δ) < FL(δ), for δ ∈ (δmin, δmax).
Proof: Define λ(δ) ≡ fH(δ)/fL(δ), for all δ. First, notice that λ(δmin) < 1, otherwise
λ(δmin) ≥ 1, for δ ∈ (δmin, δ1)
⇒λ(δmin) > 1, for δ > δ1,
which implies that, for δ < δ1
FL(δ) =
∫ δ
δmin
fL(d˜)dδ˜ ≤
∫ δ
δmin
fH(d˜)dδ˜ = FH(δ),
and for δ > δ1
FL(δ) = FL(δ1) +
∫ δ
δ1
fL(d˜)dδ˜
< FH(δ1) +
∫ δ
δ1
fL(d˜)dδ˜
= FH(δ),
therefore 1 = FL(δmax) < FH(δmax) = 1, a contradiction.
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Define δ = inf{δ|λ(δ) = 1}. From Assumption 1, δ is well defined and δ < δmax, otherwise
λ(δ) < 1, for all δ < δmax, and
1 = FH(δmax) =
∫ δmax
δmin
fH(δ)dδ <
∫ δmax
δmin
fL(δ)dδ = FL(δmax) = 1,
a contradiction.
Finally, there exists δ¯ < δmax, such that λ(δ¯) > 1. If this is not the case, then λ(δ) = 1 for
all δ ∈ (δ, δmax], therefore
1 = FH(δmax) = FH(δmin) +
∫ δmax
δmin
fH(δ)dδ
= FH(δmin) +
∫ δmax
δmin
fL(δ)dδ
< FL(δmin) +
∫ δmax
δmin
fL(δ)dδ
= FL(δmax) = 1,
a contradiction.
Thus fH(δ) < fL(δ), for δ ∈ [δmin, δ); fH(δ) ≥ fL(δ), for δ ∈ (δ, δ¯]; and fH(δ) > fL(δ), for
δ ∈ (δ¯, δmax]. For δ ≤ δ, it is clear that FH(δ) < FL(δ). Suppose that FH(δˆ) = FL(δˆ), for
δˆ ∈ (δ, δmax). Then
1 = FL(δmax) = FL(δˆ) +
∫ θ¯
δˆ
fL(δ)dδ +
∫ θmax
θ¯
fL(δ)dδ
= FH(δˆ) +
∫ θ¯
δˆ
fL(δ)dδ +
∫ θmax
θ¯
fL(δ)dδ
< FL(δmin) +
∫ δmax
δmin
fH(δ)dδ
= FH(δmax) = 1,
a contradiction. This proves the claim. 
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Claim 2 Given Assumption 1, for µt ∈ (0, 1):
(i) Eδ[µhδ (µt)|H] ≥ Eδ[µhδ (µt)|L], with strict inequality if pI(µt, L) > 0.
(ii) Eδ[µlδ(µt)|H] ≤ Eδ[µlδ(µt)|L], with strict inequality if pI(µt, H) < 1.
Proof: When pI(µt, L) > 0, and the inefficient government sends signal h with positive
probability in state L, the updated reputation following a report y = h and the observation
of δ, given by µhδ (µt) in (2.7), is strictly increasing in the likelihood ratio λ(δ) = fH(δ)/fL(δ),
and it is constant if pI(µt, L) = 0. Given Assumption 1, if pI(µt, L) > 0
∫
∆
µhδ (µt)fH(δ)dδ −
∫
∆
µhδ (µt)fL(δ)dδ
=µhδ (µt)[FH(δ)− FL(δ)]|δmaxδmin −
∫
∆
∂µhδ (µt)
∂δ
[FH(δ)− FL(δ)]dδ
=−
∫
∆/(δ1,δ2)
∂µhδ (µt)
∂δ
[FH(δ)− FL(δ)]dδ −
∫ δ2
δ1
∂µhδ (µt)
∂δ
[FH(δ)− FL(δ)]dδ,
>0
where the inequality comes from the fact that [FH(δ)−FL(δ)] < 0 for δ ∈ (δmin, δmax), and
because λ(δ) is strictly increasing for δ ∈ (δ1, δ2), and so is µhδ (µt). This result implies that
the expected value of µhδ (µt) is strictly larger in state H than in state L. In other words, the
government’s expected reputation after a signal h is higher when the the report is truthful
and the state is H.
Similarly, if pI(µt, H) < 1, and the government sends signal l with positive probability in
state H, the updated reputation µlδ(µt) in (2.8) is strictly decreasing in the likelihood ratio
λ(δ), and it is constant if pI(µt, H) = 1. Given Assumption 1, pI(µt, H) < 1
∫
∆
µlδ(µt)fH(δ)dδ −
∫
∆
µlδ(µt)fL(δ)dδ < 0,
which means that the expected updated reputation after a signal l is higher when the true
state is L instead of H. 
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Claim 3 Given Assumption 1, for µt ∈ (0, 1):
(i) µ¯t(µt, H, h) > µ¯t(µt, L, h), with strict inequality if pI(µt, L) > 0.
(ii) µ¯t(µt, L, l) > µ¯t(µt, H, l), with strict inequality if pI(µt, H) < 1.
Proof: Under Assumption 3-A, the realization of δ is always observed and, from (2.10),
µ¯t(µt, s, y) = Eδ[µyδ(µt)|s]. In this case, therefore the result follows immediately from Claim
2.
Under Assumption 3-B, the realization of δ is only observed if n ≥ N(θ), from (2.12)
µ¯t(µt, s, y) = P
∗(µt, y)Eδ[µyδ(µt)|s] + [1− P ∗(µt, y)]µy(µt),
and the result also follows from Claim 2. 
The intuition behind Claim 3 is the following. Since the efficient government is always
truthful, whenever the realization of δ is such that a false report is likely, the entrepreneurs
revise their beliefs about the government toward a lower reputation. Hence, if the govern-
ment send a signal h (l), the expected reputation is lower if true state is L instead of H (H
instead of L).
Proof of Lemma 9
Let µt ∈ (0, 1). It is sufficient to show that GH > 0, where GH is the gain from truthful
disclosure in state H, given by (2.13). Suppose that GH ≤ 0. Then,
µ¯t(µt, L, l) ≥ µ¯t(µt, H, l) ≥ µ¯t(µt, H, h) ≥ µ¯t(µt, L, h), (A.5)
where the first and last inequalities come from Claim 3, and the second one follows from
GH ≤ 0. If pI(µt, L) > 0, from Claim 3 the last inequality in (A.5) is strict, therefore
µ¯t(µt, L, l) > µ¯t(µt, L, h). This implies that GL, given by (2.14), is strictly positive, and
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therefore the government only sends signal l in state L, a contradiction with pI(µt, L) > 0.
Hence pI(µt, L) = 0, and from (2.7)
µhδ (µt) =
piEµt
piEµt + piIpI(µt, H)(1− µ) = µ
h(µt),
where µh(µt) is given by (2.3). From (2.10) and (2.12), it follows that µ¯(µt, H, h) = µ
h(µt).
To get a contradiction, I need to show that µ¯(µt, H, l) < µ¯(µt, H, h), which implies that
GH > 0. Notice that µ
h(µt) is strictly decreasing in pI(µt, H), and from (2.4) and (2.8),
both µl(µt) and µ
l
δ(µt) are strictly increasing in pI(µt, H), and so is µ¯(µt, H, l). It suffices
to show that, for pI(µt, H) = 1, µ¯(µt, H, l) < µ¯(µt, H, h) = µ
h(µt).
If pI(µt, H) = 1
µ¯(µt, H, h) = µ
h(µt) =
piEµt
piEµt + piI(1− µ) ,
and from (2.4), (2.8), (2.10) and (2.12)
µ¯(µt, H, l) = µ
l(µt) =
(1− piE)µt
(1− piE)µt + (1− piI)(1− µt) .
Then
µ¯(µt, H, l) < µ¯(µt, H, h)
⇔ piEµt
piEµt + piI(1− µ) >
(1− piE)µt
(1− piE)µt + (1− piI)(1− µt)
⇔ piE [(1− piE)µt + (1− piI)(1− µt)] > (1− piE)[piEµt + piI(1− µt)]
⇔ piE(1− piI) > (1− piE)piI
⇔ (1− piI)
(1− piE) > piIpiI ,
which is true, since piE > piI . Thus GH > 0, a contradiction.
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Proof of Lemma 10
Let pµ ≡ pI(µ,L). From Lemma 9, pI(µt, H, h) = 1.
(i). From (2.3),(2.4),(2.7),(2.8), (2.10) and (2.12), µ¯(0, s, y) = 0, for all s and y, and
µ¯(1, s, y) = 1, for all s and y. Thus G(0, p) = G(1, p) = 0.
(ii).
GL(µ, 0) =
(1− piE)µ
(1− piE)µt + (1− piI)(1− µ) −
piEµ
piEµt + piI(1− µ) , (A.6)
then
GL(µ, 0) < 0⇔ (1− piI)
(1− piE) > piIpiI ,
which holds, since piE > piI .
(iii). If pµ = 1, then the inefficient government always sends y = h. In this case, en-
trepreneurs are sure that the government is efficient when y = l, but are uncertain about the
type when y = h. Thus µ¯(µ, s, L) = 1 and µ¯(µ,L, h) < 1, which implies that GL(µ, 1) > 0.
(iv). From (A.6)
∂
∂µ
GL(µ, 0) =
(1− piE)(1− piI)
[(1− piE)µt + (1− piI)(1− µ)]2 −
piEpiI
[piEµt + piI(1− µ)]2 ,
and
∂2
∂µ2
GL(µ, 0) = 2
(1− piE)(1− piI)(piE − piI)
[(1− piE)µt + (1− piI)(1− µ)]3 + 2
piEpiI(piE − piI)
[piEµt + piI(1− µ)]3 > 0.
Proof of Lemma 11
Let µt ∈ (0, 1). From Lemma 10 part (ii), if entrepreneurs believe that pµ = 0, then the
government is strictly better off by deviating and sending signal y = h. From Lemma 10
part (iii), if entrepreneurs believe that pµ = 1, then the government is strictly better off
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by deviating and sending signal y = l in state L. If an equilibrium exists, then pµ ∈ (0, 1),
and the government must be indifferent between sending signals h and l when the state is
L, which implies that GL(µ, pµ) = 0. From Lemma 10 parts (ii) and (iii), and from the
continuity of GL(µ, p) in p, there exists pµ ∈ (0, 1) such that GL(µ, pµ) = 0, therefore an
equilibrium exists.
Under Assumption 3-A,
GL(µ, pµ) =
(1− piE)µ
(1− piE)µt + (1− piI)(1− pµ)(1− µ)
− Eδ
 piEµt
piEµ+
[
piI +
fL(δ)
fH(δ)
(1− piI)pµ
]
(1− µ)
∣∣∣∣∣∣L
 ,
thus GL(µ, pµ) is strictly increasing in pµ. In this case, there exists a unique p
∗
µ ∈ (0, 1)
that solves GL(µ, pµ) = 0.
Proof of Proposition 3
Let µt ∈ (0, 1). From Lemma 11, if an equilibrium where the efficient government follows
a full disclosure policy exists, the inefficient government’s strategy for period t in such
an equilibrium is given by pI(µt, H) = 1 and pI(µ,L) = pµ ∈ (0, 1), where pµ solves
GL(µ, pµ) = 0. It is left to show that given the inefficient government’s strategy and the
entrepreneurs’ beliefs, it is indeed optimal for the efficient government to be truthful. If
entrepreneurs believe that the efficient government is truthful, then:(1) in the proof of
Lemma 9 I show that GH > 0; (2) and from Lemma 11, the inefficient government chooses
pµ such that GL(µ, pµ) = 0. From GH > 0, the efficient government strictly prefers to be
truthful in state H, and from GL = 0, the efficient government is indifferent in state L.
Thus an equilibrium where the efficient government is always truthful exists. Furthermore,
if Assumption 3-A holds, from Lemma 11, the equilibrium is unique, since there exists a
unique p∗µ that solves GL(µ, pµ) = 0.
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Proof that there is no equilibrium where type I follows a full disclosure policy
Lemma 19 Let µt ∈ (0, 1). In equilibrium, the inefficient government never follows a full
disclosure policy in period t. There is no equilibrium where
pI(µt, H) = 1− pI(µt, L) = 1.
Proof: If the inefficient government is always truthful, then
µhδ (µt) =
[
piEpE(µt, H) +
fL(δ)
fH(δ)
(1− piE)pE(µt, L)
]
µt[
piEpE(µt, H) +
fL(δ)
fH(δ)
(1− piE)pE(µt, L)
]
µt + piI(1− µ)
,
and
µlδ(µt) =
[
fH(δ)
fL(δ)
piE(1− pE(µt, H)) + (1− piE)(1− pE(µt, L))
]
µt[
fH(δ)
fL(δ)
piE(1− pE(µt, H)) + (1− piE)(1− pE(µt, L))
]
µt + (1− piI)(1− µt)
,
therefore µhδ (µt) is strictly decreasing in λ(δ) = fH(δ)/fL(δ) if pE(µt, L) > 0, and constant
otherwise; µlδ(µt) is strictly increasing in λ(δ) if pE(µt, H) < 0, and constant otherwise. For
µt ∈ (0, 1), following similar arguments to those in Claim 3, Assumption 1 implies:
(A) µ¯t(µt, H, h) < µ¯t(µt, L, h), with strict inequality if pE(µt, L) > 0.
(B) µ¯t(µt, L, l) < µ¯t(µt, H, l), with strict inequality if pE(µt, H) < 1.
This means that if the efficient government is the only type that might not be truthful, the
government’s reputation increases whenever the realization of δ is such that a false report
is likely. If the government send a signal h (l), the expected reputation is higher if the true
state is L instead of H (H instead of L).
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If the inefficient government is truthful, then GH ≥ 0, which implies that
µ¯t(µt, L, h) ≥ µ¯t(µt, H, h) ≥ µ¯t(µt, H, l) ≥ µ¯t(µt, L, l), (A.7)
where the first and last inequalities come from (A) and (B) above, and the second one
follows from GH ≥ 0. If either pE(µt, L) > 0 or pE(µt, H) < 1, from (A) and (B), either the
first or the third inequalities in (A.7) are strict, therefore and µ¯t(µt, L, l) > µ¯t(µt, L, h). This
implies that both GH > 0 and GL > 0, thus the inefficient government is always truthful.
However, from Lemma 11, there is no equilibrium in which both types of government are
always truthful, thus there is no equilibrium where the inefficient government is truthful.

A.3.3. Equilibrium of the game between entrepreneurs
In this section, I characterize the equilibrium of the game between entrepreneurs, conditional
on an expected value of δ given by δ¯. I provide results that will be used to prove Proposition
4. The results in this section are based on Galvao and Shalders (2017).
Lemma 20 For a given public signal y, if pi(x, y) ≥ pi′(x, y) for all x, then uy(x, pi) ≥
uy(x, pi
′) for all x.
Proof:
η(δ¯, x) ≥ η′(δ¯, x)∀x⇒ n(δ¯, θ, η) ≥ n(δ¯, θ, η′)∀θ ⇒ A(δ¯, η) ⊇ A(δ¯, η′)
⇒ u(δ¯, x, η) ≥ u(δ¯, x, η′).

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For k ∈ [θmin − ε, θmax + ε], let the indicator function Ik be defined as
Ik(x) =
 1, if x ≤ k0, if x > k . (A.8)
Suppose that the investment strategies are given by ai(δ¯, xi) = Ik(xi), for all i: entrepreneurs
follow a cutoff strategy, investing if and only if xi ≤ k. The number of ventures is thus
given by
n(δ¯, θ, Ik) = G(k − θ). (A.9)
Note that n(δ¯, θ, I) is strictly decreasing in θ for θ ∈ (k− ε, k+ ε), and constant otherwise.
Let
tk ≡ sup{θ|n(δ¯, θ, I) ≥ N(θ)},
and let θk = min{tk, θmin}. If the probability of failure is below tk when entrepreneurs
follow Ik, then the number of ventures is large enough so that the successful ventures pay
v+ δ. If k ∈ (θmin− ε, θmax + ε), there is a unique θ such that n(δ¯, θ, I) = G(k− θ) = N(θ),
and therefore θk = k −G−1(N(θk)).
Let ψ(k) = θk − k. The following lemma characterizes θk and ψ(k).
Lemma 21 (i) The function ψ(·) is continuous and decreasing, with ψ(k) ∈ [−ε, ε], for
all k.
(ii) For k ∈ (θmin + ε, θmax − ε), ψ(·) is differentiable, with derivative ψ′(k) > −1.
(iii) θk is increasing in k, for all k.
Proof: Let k solve G(k−θ) = N(θmin). Then k = G−1(N(θmin))+θmin ∈ (θmin−ε, θmin +ε).
If k < k, then for all θ
N(θ) ≥ N(θmin) = G(k − θ) ≥ G(k − θ)⇒ θk = θmin ∈ (k − ε, k + ε).
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Let k¯ solve G(k¯− θmax) = N(θmax). Then k¯ = G−1(N(θmax)) + θmax ∈ (θmax− ε, θmax + ε).
If k > k¯, then for all θ
G(k − θmax) ≥ G(k¯ − θmax) = N(θmax) =⇒ θk = θmax ∈ (k − ε, k + ε).
For k ∈ (k, k¯), we have θk = k −G−1(N(θk)) ∈ (k + ε, k + ε). The function ψ(k) = θk − k
is then given by
ψ(k) =

θmax − k, if k < k = θmin +G−1(N(θmin))
−G−1(N(θk)), if k ≤ k ≤ k¯
θmin − k, if k > k¯ = θmax +G−1(N(θmax))
. (A.10)
From (A.10), it is clear that ψ(k) is continuous in k. Since N(θ) is increasing in θ, then
θk is increasing in k, which implies that ψ(k) is decreasing in k. Since k ∈ (θk − ε, θk + ε),
then ψ(k) ∈ (−e,+ε), and part (i) is proved. If k ∈ (θmin + ε, θmax − ε) ⊆ (k, k¯),
ψ(k) = −G−1(N(θk))⇒ ψ′(k) = − N
′(k + θk)
g(G−1(N(k + θk)))
(ψ′(k) + 1)
= − N
′(k + θk)
N ′(k + θk) + g(G−1(N(k + θk)))
∈ (−1, 0],
which proves part (ii). Finally, for k ∈ (k, k¯), θk is differentiable, with derivative 1−ψ′(k) >
0, and it is constant otherwise. This proves part (iii). 
From 1.12 and the definition of ψ, the expected payoff for the entrepreneur who observed
the cutoff signal k is given by
u(δ¯, k, Ik) = v
∫ k+ε
k−ε
(1− θ)φ(θ|k)dθ + δ¯
∫ k+ψ(k)
k−ε
(1− θ)φ(θ|k)dθ. (A.11)
Since φ(·|k) and the limits of integration in (A.11) are continuous in k (because ψ(·) is
continuous), u(δ¯, k, Ik) is continuous in the cutoff k.
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Lemma 22 For k ∈ (θmin +ε, θmax−ε), the payoff function u(δ¯, k, Ik) is strictly decreasing
in k.
Proof: From (1.2) and (A.11), the payoff function is given by
u(δ¯, k, Ik) =v
∫ k+ε
k−ε
(1− θ) g(k − θ)
G(k − θmin)−G(k − θmax)dθ
+ δ¯
∫ k+ψ(k)
k−ε
(1− θ) g(k − θ)
G(k − θmin)−G(k − θmax)dθ. (A.12)
From (A.10), ψ(·) is differentiable in k for k ∈ (θmin + ε, θmax − ε), and so is u(δ¯, k, Ik).
Differentiating u(δ¯, k, Ik) with respect to k and using the fact that G(k − θmax) = g(k −
θmax) = 0, for k < θmax − ε, yield
d
dk
u(δ¯, k, Ik)
=
v
G(k − θmin)
[
(1− k − ε)g(−ε)− (1− k + ε)g(ε) +
∫ k+ε
k−ε
(1− θ)g′(k − θ)dθ
−
∫ k+ε
k−ε
(1− θ)g(k − θ)g(k − θmin)
G(k − θmin) dθ
]
+
δ¯
G(k − θmin)
[
(1− k − ψ(k))g(−ψ(k))(1 + ψ′(k))− (1− k + ε)g(ε)
+
∫ k+ψ(k)
k−ε
(1− θ)g′(k − θ)dθ −
∫ k+ψ(k)
k−ε
(1− θ)g(k − θ)g(k − θmin)
G(k − θmin) dθ
]
≤ v
G(k − θmin)
[
(1− k − ε)g(−ε)− (1− k + ε)g(ε) +
∫ k+ε
k−ε
(1− θ)g′(k − θ)dθ
]
+
δ¯
G(k − θmin)
[
(1− k − ψ(k))g(−ψ(k))− (1− k + ε)g(ε) +
∫ k+ψ(k)
k−ε
(1− θ)g′(k − θ)dθ
]
,
where the inequality comes from ψ′(k) ≤ 0, and from the fact that the second and fourth
integrals on the RHS of the equality are positive. Define ε˜ as
ε˜ = inf{ε˜ ∈ [−ε, ε] : g′(εˆ) ≤ 0 ∀εˆ > ε˜}.
From (1.1), ε˜ is well defined. Furthermore, g′(ε˜) ≥ 0, for ε˜ ≤ ε˜, and g′(ε˜) ≤ 0, for ε˜ > ε˜.
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Define θ˜ as
θ˜ = k − ε˜.
Hence θ˜ ∈ [k − ε, k + ε]. We then have
∫ k+ε
k−ε
(1− θ)g′(k − θ)dθ ≤ (1− θ˜)
∫ θ˜
k−ε
g′(k − θ)dθ + (1− θ˜)
∫ k+ε
θ˜
g′(k − θ)dθ
= (1− θ˜)[g(ε)− g(−ε)],
and
∫ k+ψ(k)
k−ε
(1− θ)g′(k − θ)dθ ≤(1−min{θ˜, k + ψ(k)})
∫ min{θ˜,k+ψ(k)}
k−ε
g′(k − θ)dθ
+ (1−min{θ˜, k + ψ(k)})
∫ k+ψ(k)
min{θ˜,k+ψ(k)}
g′(k − θ)dθ
=(1−min{θ˜, k + ψ(k)})[g(ε)− g(−ψ(k))].
Hence
d
dk
u(δ¯, k, Ik)
≤ v
G(k − θmin)
[
(1− k − ε)g(−ε)− (1− k + ε)g(ε) + (1− θ˜)[g(ε)− g(−ε)]
]
+
δ¯
G(k − θmin) [(1− k − ψ(k))g(−ψ(k))− (1− k + ε)g(ε)
+(1−min{θ˜, k + ψ(k)})[g(ε)− g(−ψ(k))]t
]
=
v
G(k − θmin)
[
g(−ε)[θ˜ − (k + ε)]− g(ε)[θ˜ − (k − ε)]
]
+
δ¯
G(k − θmin)
[
g(−ψ(k))[min{θ˜, k + ψ(k)} − (k + ψ(k))]
−g(ε)[min{θ˜, k + ψ(k)} − (k − ψ(k))]
]
< 0,
which implies that u(δ¯, k, Ik) is strictly decreasing. 
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Proof of Proposition 4
Using Lemma 22, the proof of existence and uniqueness of equilibrium in the game between
entrepreneurs is analogous to the one in Morris and Shin (1998), Theorem 1. Entrepreneurs
follow a cutoff rule in their private signal given by Ix∗(δ¯), where x
∗(δ¯) is such that
u(δ¯, x∗(δ¯), Ix∗(δ¯)) = w, (A.13)
which means that the entrepreneur that receives the cutoff signal is indifferent between
investing and working. Since 2ε < min{θ−θmin, θmax−θ¯δH}, then x∗(δ¯) ∈ (θmin+ε, θmax−ε).
The equilibrium number of ventures is
n(δ¯, θ, Ix∗(δ¯)) = G(x
∗(δ¯)− θ),
which is decreasing in θ. The threshold θ below which n(δ¯, θ, Ix∗(δ¯)) ≥ N(θ) is given by
θ∗(δ¯) ≡ θx∗(δ¯). From (A.11), it is clear that u(δ¯, k, Ik) is strictly increasing in δ¯, for all k.
Lemma 22 and (A.13) thus imply that x∗(δ¯) is strictly increasing in δ. Finally, from Lemma
21, part (iii), θ∗(δ¯) is also strictly increasing in δ¯.
A.3.4. Welfare function
This section presents properties of the welfare function and establishes results used to prove
Lemmas 12, 13, and 14.
Since x∗(δ¯) ∈ (θmin + ε, θmax− ε), then G(x∗(δ¯)− θmin) ≥ G(ε) = 1, and G(x∗(δ¯)− θmax) ≤
G(−ε) = 0. From (A.12), the expected payoff after observing x∗(δ¯) can be written as
u(δ¯, x∗(δ¯), Ix∗(δ¯)) = v
∫ x∗(δ¯)+ε
x∗(δ¯)−ε
(1− θ)g(x∗(δ¯)− θ)dθ+ δ¯
∫ x∗(δ¯)+ψ(x∗(δ¯))
x∗(δ¯)−ε
(1− θ)g(x∗(δ¯)− θ)dθ,
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and the indifference condition (A.13) implies
v
∫ x∗(δ¯)+ε
x∗(δ¯)−ε
(1− θ)g(x∗(δ¯)− θ)dθ + δ¯
∫ x∗(δ¯)+ψ(x∗(δ¯))
x∗(δ¯)−ε
(1− θ)g(x∗(δ¯)− θ)dθ = w
⇒
∫ x∗(δ¯)+ε
x∗(δ¯)−ε
[(1− θ)v − w]g(x∗(δ¯)− θ)dθ = −δ¯
∫ x∗(δ¯)+ψ(x∗(δ¯))
x∗(δ¯)−ε
(1− θ)g(x∗(δ¯)− θ)dθ.
(A.14)
For s ∈ {H,L}, define the function Vs(x∗) as
Vs(x
∗) =(v + δs)
∫ x∗−ε
θmin
(1− θ)dθ +
∫ x∗+ψ(x∗)
x∗−ε
[(1− θ)(v + δs)− w]G(x∗ − θ)dθ
+
∫ x∗+ψ(x∗)
x∗−ε
[(1− θ)v − w]G(x∗ − θ)dθ + w
∫ θmax
x∗−ε
dθ.
Thus Vs(x
∗(δ¯)) = Ws(δ¯), for all δ¯, where Ws(δ¯) is the welfare function given by (2.22).
From Lemma 21, part (ii), ψ(k) is differentiable at x∗(δ¯), and ψ′(x∗(δ¯)) > −1. Hence Vs(x∗)
differentiable:
∂
∂x∗
Vs(x
∗) =
(v + δs)
{
1− x∗ + ε+ [1− x∗ − ψ(x∗)][1 + ψ′(x∗)]G(−ψ(x∗))− (1− x+ ε)G(ε)}
+ v
{
(1− x∗ − ε)G(−ε)− [1− x∗ − ψ(x∗)][1 + ψ′(x∗)]G(−ψ(x∗))}
− w {G(−ψ(x∗))[1 + ψ′(x∗)]−G(ε)−G(−ε)−G(−ψ(x∗))[1 + ψ′(x∗)] + 1}
+
∫ x∗+ψ(x∗)
x∗−ε
[(1− θ)(v + δs)− w]g(x∗ − θ)dθ +
∫ x∗+ψ(x∗)
x∗−ε
[(1− θ)v − w]g(x∗ − θ)dθ
=
∫ x∗+ε
x∗−ε
[(1− θ)v − w]g(x∗ − θ)dθ
+ δs
{
[1− x∗ − ψ(x∗)][1 + ψ′(x∗)]G(−ψ(x∗)) +
∫ x∗+ψ(x∗)
x∗−ε
(1− θ)g(x∗ − θ)dθ
}
. (A.15)
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Using (A.14),
∂
∂x∗
Vs(x
∗)
∣∣∣∣
x∗=x∗(δ¯)
(A.16)
= (δs − δ¯)
∫ x∗+ψ(x∗)
x∗−ε
(1− θ)g(x∗ − θ)dθ + δs[1− x∗ − ψ(x∗)][1 + ψ′(x∗)]G(−ψ(x∗)).
(A.17)
Proof of Lemma 12
From (A.16)
∂
∂x∗
VH(x
∗)
∣∣∣∣
x∗=x∗(δ¯)
= (δH − δ¯)
∫ x∗+ψ(x∗)
x∗−ε
(1− θ)g(x∗ − θ)dθ + δH [1− x∗ + ψ(x∗)][1 + ψ′(x∗)]G(−ψ(x∗)).
Since δH ≥ δ¯ (with strict inequality when entrepreneurs assign a positive probability to L),
and ψ′(x∗(δ¯)) > −1, then
∂
∂x∗
VH(x
∗)
∣∣∣∣
x∗=x∗(δ¯)
≥ 0,
with strict inequality if δ¯ < δH . From VH(x
∗(δ¯)) = WH(δ¯), and since x∗(δ¯) is strictly
increasing, it follows that
∂
∂δ¯
WH(δ¯) =
∂
∂x∗
VH(x
∗)
∣∣∣∣
x∗=x∗(δ¯)
∂x∗(δ¯)
∂δ¯
≥ 0,
with with strict inequality if δ¯ < δH .
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Proof of Lemma 13
From (A.16)
∂
∂x∗
VL(x
∗)
∣∣∣∣
x∗=x∗(δ¯)
= (δL − δ¯)
∫ x∗+ψ(x∗)
x∗−ε
(1− θ)g(x∗ − θ)dθ + δL[1− x∗ − ψ(x∗)][1 + ψ′(x∗)]G(−ψ(x∗)).
Since [1− (x∗ + ψ(x∗))] > (1− δ), for θ > x∗ + ψ(x∗), and
G(−ψ(x∗)) =
∫ x∗+ε
x∗+ψ(x∗)
g(x∗ − θ)dθ, (A.18)
then
∂
∂x∗
VL(x
∗)
∣∣∣∣
x∗=x∗(δL)
≥ δL[1 + ψ′(x∗(δL))]
∫ x∗(δL)+ε
x∗(δL)+ψ(x∗(δL))
(1− θ)g(x∗(δL)− θ)dθ > 0.
From VL(x
∗(δ¯)) = WL(δ¯), and since x∗(δ¯) is strictly increasing, it follows that
∂
∂δ¯
WL(δ¯)
∣∣∣∣
δ¯=δL
=
∂
∂x∗
VL(x
∗)
∣∣∣∣
x∗=x∗(δL)
∂x∗(δ¯)
∂δ¯
∣∣∣∣
δ¯=δL
> 0.
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Proof of Lemma 14
From (A.15) and (A.18)
∂
∂x∗
VL(x
∗)
∣∣∣∣
x∗=x∗(δH)
=
∫ x∗+ψ(x∗)
x∗−ε
[(1− θ)(v + δl)− w]g(x∗ − θ)dθ +
∫ x∗+ε
x∗+ψ(x∗)
[(1− θ)v − w]g(x∗ − θ)dθ
+ δL[1− (x∗ + ψ(x∗))][1 + ψ′(x∗)]
∫ x∗+ε
x∗+ψ(x∗)
(1− θ)g(x∗ − θ)dθ
<
∫ x∗+ε
x∗+ψ(x∗)
[(1− θ)v − w]g(x∗ − θ)dθ
+ δL[1− (x∗ + ψ(x∗))][1 + ψ′(x∗)]
∫ x∗+ε
x∗+ψ(x∗)
(1− θ)g(x∗ − θ)dθ
≤
∫ x∗+ε
x∗+ψ(x∗)
[(1− (x∗ + ψ(x∗)))v − w]g(x∗ − θ)dθ
+ δL[1− (x∗ + ψ(x∗))][1 + ψ′(x∗)]
∫ x∗+ε
x∗+ψ(x∗)
(1− θ)g(x∗ − θ)dθ
=
∫ x∗+ε
x∗+ψ(x∗)
[(1− (x∗ + ψ(x∗)))(v + δL)− w]g(x∗ − θ)dθ
+ δL[1− (x∗ + ψ(x∗))]ψ′(x∗)
∫ x∗+ε
x∗+ψ(x∗)
(1− θ)g(x∗ − θ)dθ
<
∫ x∗+ε
x∗+ψ(x∗)
[(1− θ¯L)(v + δL)− w]g(x∗ − θ)dθ
+ δL[1− (x∗ + ψ(x∗))]ψ′(x∗)
∫ x∗+ε
x∗+ψ(x∗)
(1− θ)g(x∗ − θ)dθ
=δL[1− (x∗ + ψ(x∗))]ψ′(x∗)
∫ x∗+ε
x∗+ψ(x∗)
(1− θ)g(x∗ − θ)dθ
< 0.
The first inequality follows from (1 − θ)(v + δL) < w, for θ > θ¯L and x∗(δH) − ε > θ¯L.
The third inequality is obtained from x∗(δH) + ψ(x∗(δH)) > x∗(δH) − ε > θ¯L. The fourth
inequality follows from the definition of θL: (1−θL)(v+δL) = w. Finally, the last inequality
follows from ψ′(x∗(δH)) < 0. From VL(x∗(δ¯)) = WL(δ¯), and since x∗(δ¯) is strictly increasing,
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it follows that
∂
∂δ¯
WL(δ¯)
∣∣∣∣
δ¯=δH
=
∂
∂x∗
VL(x
∗)
∣∣∣∣
x∗=x∗(δH)
∂x∗(δ¯)
∂δ¯
∣∣∣∣
δ¯=δH
< 0.
From the continuity of WL, there exists δ˜ such that
∂
∂δ¯
WL(δ¯) < 0, for δ¯ > δ˜.
A.4. Credit Market
This section drops the assumption that only labor is necessary to start a new venture. Now
a venture also requires one unit of capital, which is borrowed in a perfectly competitive
credit market. There exists an equilibrium for the model with capital where the investment
decisions are the same as the equilibrium decisions in the model without capital, as described
in Proposition 4. In this equilibrium, the welfare results from Section 2.4 still hold.
There are two types of agents: entrepreneurs and lenders. The agents’ problem in each
period is now similar to the one in Veldkamp (2005).10 In each period, the entrepreneurs
now have to borrow one unit of capital to invest in a new venture. An entrepreneur that
does not invest works for a fixed wage w˜. There is a continuum of lenders, who are index
by j and uniformly distributed on [0, J ], with J > 1.11 As the entrepreneurs, lenders are
infinitely-lived, risk-neutral profit maximizers. At the beginning of each period, lenders can
either use one indivisible unit of capital to buy a risk-free bond which pays a return of
(1 + r) at the end of the period, or they can lend capital to an entrepreneurs. The risk-free
rate is exogenous and constant. The lender receives (1 + ρ) at the end of the period if the
venture is successful, and nothing otherwise. The market lending rate is endogenous and
depends on the expected rate of default. It is assumed that, when entrepreneur i and a
10In her paper, there is a finite number of entrepreneurs and lenders, who are infinitely lived, risk-neutral,
and profit maximizers. There are more lenders than entrepreneurs, and the credit market is perfectly
competitive. In each period, entrepreneurs can either borrow one unit of capital to invest in a new venture,
or work for a fixed wage. Successful ventures pay vi to entrepreneur i. The probability of success in each
period is the same for all new ventures, and it depends on an unobservable and persistent state variable.
Lenders can either invest one unit of capital in a risk-free bond that pays (1 + r), or lend it to potential
borrowers, who pay (1 + ρ) in case of success, and nothing otherwise. In equilibrium, since lenders are
perfectly competitive, the expected return from lending is the risk-free rate: P(success)(1 + ρ) = 1 + r.
11There are more lenders than entrepreneurs.
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lender j meet, the lender can perfectly observe the entrepreneur’s private signal about the
probability of failure, xi.
A Markov strategy for lender j is ρj : [0, 1]× Y ×X → R, where ρj(µt, y, x) is the interest
rate that lender j charges from an entrepreneur who received a signal x, conditional on
(µt, y). Given a reputation µt and a public signal y, agents form beliefs about the state and
lenders announce a pricing function ρj(µt, y, x). Entrepreneurs can choose which lenders
to borrow from, but lenders cannot commit to an interest rate. Once lender j observes
xi, he can decide not to lend to entrepreneur i. In this case, the lender buys the risk-free
bond, while the entrepreneur can search for another lender. Interest rate ρj(µt, y, xi) is only
credible if lender j’s expected payoff conditional on (µt, y, xi) is greater than (1 + r).
Apart from the introduction of the lenders and the requirement that one unit of capital
must be borrowed to start a new venture, the model is the same as in Section 1.3. The
timing in period t is as follows:
1. Reputation starts at µt.
2. Nature draws s ∈ {H,L}.
3. The government observes s and sends a signal y ∈ {h, l}.
4. Agents form beliefs about the state and lenders announce pricing functions
{ρj(µt, y, ·)}j=∈[0,J ].
5. Nature draws the probability of failure θ.
6. Entrepreneurs observe interest rates and private signals about θ, and decide whether
or not borrow.
7. If entrepreneur i and lender j agree on a loan, i borrows at rate ρj(µt, y, xi).
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8. Lenders not matched with borrowers invest in the risk-free bond. Entrepreneurs that
do not invest receive a wage w˜.
9. The outcomes of all ventures are publicly observed, payoffs are received, and the
reputation is updated to µt+1.
Let δ¯(µt, y) = δ¯, and let the measure of entrepreneurs who invest, given δ¯ and a private
signal x, be denoted by η(µt, y, x). The number of ventures is characterized in (2.15), and
the event where ventures pay (v+ δ) is given by A(µt, y, η), described in (2.17). Lender j
′s
expected payoff from lending to an entrepreneur who receives private signal x is thus
Rj(µt, y, x, η) = min{1 + ρj(µt, y, x), v}
∫
[x−ε,x+ε]/A(µt,y,η)
(1− θ)φ(θ|x)dθ
+Eδ[min{1 + ρj(µt, y, x), v + δ}|µt, y]
∫
[x−ε,x+ε]∩A(µt,y,η)
(1− θ)φ(θ|x)dθ.
(A.19)
In equilibrium, lender j enters into a contract with an entrepreneurs who receives a signal
x if
Rj(µt, y, x) ≥ 1 + r.
The interest rate is only credible if ρj(µt, y, x) is such that Rj(µt, y, x) ≥ 1 + r. If
Rj(µt, y, x) < 1 + r, entrepreneurs that receive a signal x know that lender j will renege on
the interest rate ρj(µt, y, x) once he observes a signal x.
A.4.1. Equilibrium
The opportunity cost of a starting a new venture in the model without capital is w, the
cost of labor. With the introduction of capital, the opportunity cost of a venture is now
1 + r + w˜, the cost of labor plus capital. If w = 1 + r + w˜, there is an equilibrium in the
model with capital that features the same investment strategies for the entrepreneurs as in
the the baseline model from Section 1.3.
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The expected surplus from a venture is given by
S(µt, y, x, η) = v
∫ x+ε
x−ε
(1−θ)φ(θ|x)dθ+δ¯(µt, y)
∫
[x−ε,x+ε]∩A(µt,y,η)
(1−θ)φ(θ|x)dθ−(1+r+w˜),
(A.20)
which is the venture’s expected payoff given (µt, y, x, η), minus the opportunity cost of
capital and labor. Consider the following strategy for lenders: if S(µt, y, x, η) ≥ 0, lender
j sets ρj(µt, y, x) such that Rj(µt, y, x) = 1 + r; otherwise set ρj(µt, y, x) so high that no
entrepreneur would borrow from j.12 Consider the following rule for entrepreneurs to choose
a lender: if entrepreneur i decides to borrow, only choose lender j if ρj(µt, y, xi) such that
Rj(µt, y, xi) ≤ 1 + r. The pricing strategy for lenders and the rule for borrowers are part
of an equilibrium. No lender has an incentive to deviate: if j sets ρj(µt, y, x
′) such that
Rj(µt, y, x
′) > 1 + r, no entrepreneur who observes x′ borrows from j; if j sets ρj(µt, y, x′)
such that Rj(µt, y, x
′) < 1 + r, the interest rate is not credible and no entrepreneur who
observes x′ borrows from j. No borrower has an incentive to deviate: entrepreneur i is
better off by rejecting any lender j who sets Rj(µt, y, xi) > 1+r, given that there are J > 1
lenders who are charging lower interest rates.
In such an equilibrium, after observing xi, entrepreneur i’s expected payoff from borrowing
to invest is
u˜(µt, y, xi, η) = v
∫ xi+ε
xi−ε
(1−θ)φ(θ|xi)dθ+ δ¯(µt, y)
∫
[xi−ε,xi+ε]∩A(δ¯,η)
(1−θ)φ(θ|xi)dθ−(1+r).
(A.21)
Compared to the payoff in the model without capital, given by u in equation (1.12), we
have
u˜(µt, y, xi, η) = u(δ¯(µt, y), xi, η)− (1 + r), for all µt, y, xi, η.
Entrepreneur i invests in equilibrium if
u˜(µt, y, xi, η) ≥ w˜ ⇔ u(δ¯(µt, y), xi, η) ≥ 1 + r + w˜. (A.22)
12For example, ρj(µt, y, x) = v + 2δmax.
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Condition (A.22) is the same as condition (2.19) when w = 1 + r + w˜. In this case, the
entrepreneurs’ equilibrium investment strategies are the same as in the model with no
capital, and Proposition 4 applies, with δ¯(µt, y) = δ¯.
The agents’ expected welfare in state s is thus given by
W˜s(δ¯) =(v + δs)
∫ θ∗(δ¯)
θmin
(1− θ)G(x∗(δ¯)− θ)dθ + v
∫ x∗(δ¯)+ε
θ∗(δ¯)
(1− θ)G(x∗(δ¯)− θ)dθ
+ (1 + r + w˜)
[∫ x∗(δ¯)+ε
x∗(δ¯)−ε
(1−G(x∗(δ¯)− θ))dθ +
∫ θmax
x∗(δ¯)+ε
dθ
]
+ (J − 1)(1 + r).
(A.23)
The welfare in the model without capital, Ws, is described in (2.22). If w = 1 + r + w˜, we
have
W˜s(δ¯) = Ws(δ¯) + (J − 1)(1 + r).
Thus, the welfare results in Section 2.4 still hold. Lemmas 12, 13, and 14 also hold for the
welfare function W˜s, and so does Proposition 5.
In the model with credit, there are two types of default: default is total if the venture
fails; and default is partial if the payoff from a successful venture is less than 1 + ρ. In
the equilibrium above, given their beliefs, lenders are indifferent between lending of buying
risk-free bonds. In the low productivity state L, when the inefficient government makes a
false report y = h, the agents’ beliefs are biased towards the high productivity state H.
Lenders thus underestimate the probability of partial default, and charges interest rates
that are too low. The more agents’ trust the false report h, the higher is the probability of
partial default in state L, and the lower is the lenders’ payoff.
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